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Current History, Vol. VIII, No. 3, June 1918 A Monthly Magazine of the New York Times

The New British Service Act

Provisions of Law Which Raises Military Age

The new British Military Service act became effective in April, 1918, having passed both houses of Parliament by large majorities; it immediately received the royal assent. The provision applying conscription to Ireland was suspended temporarily, on the assumption that it would not be enforced until a measure of home rule for Ireland was agreed upon. The main provisions of the new service measure are as follows, as analyzed by The London Times:

RAISING OF MILITARY AGE

Men Up to 50.—Obligation to military service imposed upon every male British subject:

1. Who has at any time since Aug. 14, 1915, or who for the time being is in Great Britain, and

2. Who on April 18, 1918, had attained the age of 18 years and had not attained the age of 51 years or who at any subsequent date attains the age of 18 years.

Men Up to 55.—If it appears necessary at any time for the defense of the realm, his Majesty may, by Order in Council, declare the extension of the obligation to military service to men generally or to any class of men up to any age not exceeding 56 years. The draft of any such order is to be presented to each house of Parliament, and will not be submitted to his Majesty in Council unless each house presents an address, praying that the order may be made.

Doctors.—Duly qualified medical practitioners, who have not attained the age of 56 years, are made immediately liable to military service.

FORMER PRISONERS OF WAR

The clause in the act of May, 1916, excepting from military service any person who has been "a prisoner of war, captured or interned by the enemy, and has been released or exchanged," is to cease to have effect. It is, however, provided that the change shall be without prejudice to any undertaking, recognized by the Government, and for the time being in force, that any released or exchanged prisoner of war shall not serve in his Majesty's forces during the present war.

TIME-EXPIRED MEN

The act of May, 1916, provided that the service should not be prolonged of men who, when their times for discharge occurred, had served a period of twelve years or more and had attained the age of 41 years. This section is to cease to have effect.

EXTENSION TO IRELAND

Method of Procedure.—His Majesty may, by Order in Council, extend the act to Ireland, with the necessary modifications and adaptations.

Legal Proceedings.—An Order in Council may be issued to make special provision for the constitution of the civil court before which proceedings for any offenses punishable on summary conviction under the Reserve Forces act, the Army act, and the Military Service acts are to be brought in Ireland. The order may also assign any such proceedings to a specified civil court or courts.

WITHDRAWAL OF EXEMPTIONS

His Majesty may, by proclamation declaring that a national emergency has arisen, direct that any certificates of exemption other than those granted on the grounds of ill-health or of conscientious objection shall cease to have effect.

THE TRIBUNALS

The Local Government Board or the Secretary for Scotland may make regulations for the following purposes:

1. For providing for applications for certificates of exemption, including appeals, being made to such tribunals, constituted in such manner and for such areas as may be authorized.

2. For establishing special tribunals, committees, or panels for dealing with particular classes of cases.

3. For regulating and limiting the making of applications.

4. For making other provision to secure the expeditious making and disposal of applications.

It is provided that such regulations shall not alter the four grounds for applications for certificates of exemption—the expediency, in the national interests, that a man should be engaged in other work, business or domestic reasons, ill-health, and conscientious objection.

PENALTIES

Any person making a false statement with a view to preventing or postponing the calling up of himself or any other person, or for any medical examination, is to be liable to six months' imprisonment.

It is to be the duty of any man whose certificate has been withdrawn, or who no longer satisfies the conditions on which it was granted, to transmit it forthwith to the local office of the Ministry of National Service. If he fails without reasonable cause to do so, he will be liable to a fine of £50.

MEDICAL EXAMINATION

Any man holding a certificate of exemption (other than one from combatant service only) or applying for its renewal may at any time be required to present himself for medical examination or re-examination.

VOLUNTEER OBLIGATION

Every man granted a certificate of exemption is to join the Volunteer Force for the perid of the war, unless the tribunal dealing with the case orders to the contrary.

CONVENTIONS WITH ALLIED STATES

The act is to be read with previous acts in relation to the act of 1917, which confirmed conventions with allied States making subjects of those States in this country liable for military service. That act is also to apply to Ireland, if the act is extended to Ireland.

EXCEPTIONS

The exceptions from the act are the following:

1. Men ordinarily resident in the Dominions.

2. Members of the regular or reserve forces or of the Dominion forces, and territorials liable to foreign service.

3. Men serving in the navy, the Royal Marines, or the air force.

4. Certain categories of officers and men who have left or been discharged from the forces in consequence of disablement or ill-health; and men medically rejected, if, on further medical examination after April 5, 1917, they have been certified to be totally and permanently unfit for any form of military service.

5. Men in holy orders or regular ministers of any religious denomination.

British Aid to Italy

General Plumer's Dispatch

The report was published May 10, 1918, that 250,000 Italian troops had been concentrated in France to swell the reserves of the allied armies against the German offensive, and that this had been accomplished without weakening the Italian front, which was preparing for a threatened Austrian attack. No statement was made regarding the British troops that had gone to Italy's aid during the disaster to the Italian armies in 1917.

General Sir Herbert Plumer, who took over the command of the British troops in Italy after their arrival there, Nov. 10, 1917, submitted his official report March 9, 1918. He stated that he found on his arrival that the situation in Italy was disquieting, the Italian Army having received a severe blow, and the aid that the British and French might give could not be immediate owing to difficulties of transport. As it was then uncertain whether the Italians could hold the Piave line, it was arranged that two British divisions in conjunction with the French should move to the hills north and south of Vicenza. By the time the troops had reached this position the situation had improved and an offer was made by the British in conjunction with the French to take over a sector of the foothills of the Asiago Plateau. But as snow was imminent and special mountain equipment was difficult to provide, the suggestion was made by the Italians that the British should take over the Montsello sector, with the French on their left. This was agreed to.

Sir Herbert considers that the entrance of the French and British had an excellent moral effect and enabled the Italians to withdraw and reorganize. The Montsello sector, which was taken over on Dec. 4 and work immediately begun on its defense, is described by Sir Herbert as a hinge to the whole Italian line, joining the mountain portion facing north, from Mount Tomba to Lake Garda, to the Piave line held by the 3d Italian Army.

December was an anxious month. Several German divisions were east of the Piave, and an attempt to force the river and capture Venice was considered likely. Local attacks grew more and more severe, and, though the progress of the enemy was not great and Italian counterattacks were constantly made, the danger of a break-through increased. The Austrians were being encouraged to persevere in the hope of getting down to the plains for the Winter.

Rear lines of defense were constructed, and as time passed and the preparations were well forward the feeling of security grew, and was further increased by the recapture by the Italians of the slopes of Monte Asolone on Dec. 22. The following day Mount Melago and Col del Rosso, on the Asiago Plateau, were lost, but the Italians regained the former by a counterattack. Though Christmas Day found the situation still serious, especially on the Asiago, where the Italians, while fighting stubbornly, suffered from strain and cold, the situation showed signs of improvement. This outlook was brightened still further by the capture of Mount Tomba, with 1,500 prisoners, by the French. In this action British artillery assisted.

"During all this period," the dispatch continues, "we had carried out continuous patrol work across the River Piave and much successful counterbattery work. The Piave is a very serious obstacle, especially at this season of the year, the breadth opposite the British front being considerably over 1,000 yards, and the current 14 knots. Every form of raft and boat has been used, but wading has proved the most successful, though the icy cold water made the difficulties even greater. In spite of this there has never been any lack of volunteers for these enterprises.

"On Jan. 1 our biggest raid was carried out by the Middlesex Regiment. This was a most difficult and well-planned operation, which had for its objective the capture and surrounding of several buildings held by the enemy to a depth of 2,000 yards inland, provided a surprise could be effected. Two hundred and fifty men were passed across by wading and some prisoners were captured, but, unfortunately, the alarm was given by a party of fifty of the enemy that was encountered in an advanced post, and the progress inland had therefore, in accordance with orders, to be curtailed. The recrossing of the river was successfully effected, and our casualties were very few. An operation of this nature requires much forethought and arrangement, even to wrapping every man in hot blankets immediately on emerging from the icy water.

"The 3d Italian Army also opened the year well by clearing the Austrians from the west bank of the Piave about Zenson. This was followed on Jan. 14 by the attack of the 4th Italian Army on Mount Asolone, which, although not entirely successful, resulted in capturing over 400 Austrian prisoners. The situation had by this time so far improved that I offered to take over another sector of defense on my right in order to assist the Italians. This was agreed to, and was completed by Jan. 28. On this day and the following the 1st Italian Army carried out successful operations on the Col del Rosso—Mont Val Bella front, on the Asiago Plateau. The infantry attacked with great spirit, and captured 2,500 Austrians. British artillery took part in the above operation."

General Plumer states that in February the weather was bad, much snow having fallen, and operations were hampered. Although the British had not taken part in serious fighting, yet they had some share in the improvement which, he says, had taken place.

The work of the R. F. C. under Brig. Gen. Webb-Bowen, during the period under review (says Sir Herbert) has been quite brilliant. From the moment of arrival they made their presence felt, and very soon overcame the difficulties of the mountains. They have taken part in all operations, and rendered much assistance to the Italians in the air. They have carried out a large number of successful raids on enemy aerodromes, railway junctions, &c., and have during the period destroyed sixty-four hostile machines, a large proportion of which were German, and nine balloons, our losses to the enemy during the period being twelve machines and three balloons.

A comparison of the photographs of hostile battery positions when our artillery entered the line with the positions now occupied shows that the enemy batteries have been successfully forced back almost throughout the whole front. Some British artillery assisted both in French and Italian operations, and a frequent interchange of British and Italian batteries was made, together with counterbattery staff officers, in order that experience of each other's methods might be gained. Every effort was made to illustrate the value of counterbattery work, the value of which we had learned by experience in France, but which the Italians had not hitherto fully appreciated.

"The Italians were only too anxious to profit by any experience we could give them, and this was done not only by frequent interchange of visits of commanders and staffs to the various sectors of defense, but by the establishment of schools of instruction, at which a large number of Italian officers actually underwent the courses. About 100 Italian officers attended the courses at the various schools, together with some French officers. Similarly, British officers underwent courses at French and Italian schools."

Sir Herbert thanks the Italian authorities for their assistance, especially General Diaz, Chief of the Staff, and expresses indebtedness to Generals Fayolle and Maistre, in command of the French troops.

Emperor Charles's "Dear Sixtus" Letter

French Supplemental Statement Corroborates Its Authenticity

The publication of the letter of Emperor Charles of Austria to his brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus, in which he sought a separate peace with France, referring to the "just claims" of France to Alsace-Lorraine, and which caused the downfall of Count Czernin, the Austrian Foreign Secretary, was followed by this official denial by the Austrian Government:

The letter by his Apostolic Majesty, published by the French Premier in his communiqué of April 12, 1918, is falsified, (verfaelscht.) First of all, it may be declared that the personality of far higher rank than the Foreign Minister, who, as admitted in the official statement of April 7, undertook peace efforts in the Spring of 1917, must be understood to be not his Apostolic Majesty but Prince Sixte of Bourbon, who in the Spring of 1917 was occupied with bringing about a rapprochement between the belligerent States. As regards the text of the letter published by M. Clemenceau, the Foreign Minister declares by All Highest command that his Apostolic Majesty wrote a purely personal private letter in the Spring of 1917 to his brother-in-law, Prince Sixte of Bourbon, which contained no instructions to the Prince to initiate mediation with the President of the French Republic or any one else, to hand on communications which might be made to him, or to evoke and receive replies. This letter, moreover, made no mention of the Belgian question, and contained, relative to Alsace-Lorraine, the following-passage: "I would have used all my personal influence in favor of the French claims for the return of Alsace-Lorraine, if these claims were just. They are not, however." The second letter of the Emperor mentioned in the French Premier's communique of April 9, in which his Apostolic Majesty is said to have declared that he was "in accord with his Minister," is significantly not mentioned by the French communiqué.

This statement drew forth from the French Government the following reply:

There are rotten consciences. The Emperor Charles, finding it impossible to save his face, falls into the stammerings of a man confounded. He is now reduced to accusing his brother-in-law of forgery, by fabricating with his own hand a lying text. The original document, the text of which has been published by the French Government, was communicated in the presence of M. Jules Cambon, Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and delegated for this purpose by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the President of the Republic, who, with the authorization of the Prince, handed a copy of it to the President of the Council.

The Prince spoke of the matter to M. Ribot himself in terms which would have been devoid of sense if the text had not been that published by the French Government, is it not evidence that no conversation could have been opened, and that the President of the Republic would not even have received the Prince a second time, if the latter, at Austria's instance, had been the bearer of a document which contested our rights instead of affirming them?

The Emperor Charles's letter, as we have quoted it, was shown by Prince Sixte himself to the Chief of State. Moreover, two friends of the Prince can attest the authenticity of the letter, especially the one who received it from the Prince to copy it.

The Serbian Government, moreover, gave the lie direct to Count Czernin's statement in reference to offering peace to Serbia. Premier Pashitch was asked in the Skupshtina at Corfu by Deputy Marco Trifcovitch whether Count Czernin's statement was true. He replied that he had denied Count Czernin's statements as soon as he had received the text of the speech from Amsterdam, and that he welcomed this fresh opportunity of declaring before Parliament that, so far as Serbia was concerned, the statements were totally inaccurate. (Exclamations from the right, "Czernin lied!") The Premier then proceeded to say that Count Czernin had never made peace overtures to Serbia, and that, if he had, such proposals would not have been accepted. "All the statements of Count Czernin," continued M. Pashitch, "are only the result of Austro-Hungarian intrigues."

Premier Clemenceau explained in detail before three committees of the French Chamber, the Committees on Foreign Affairs, the Army, and the Navy, which represented practically one-fourth of the total membership, the circumstances connected with the letters; it was unanimously agreed that there was nothing in the situation to justify any further consideration than had been given them. The Paris Temps gave the following details concerning their receipt:

The Emperor's two letters, and the conversations arising out of them, will form an essential part of the proceedings before the committees today. The letter from the Emperor to Prince Sixte of Bourbon-Parma was communicated to M. Poincaré on March 31 last year, but it remained in the possession of the Prince, who gave a copy of it to M. Ribot, by whom it was placed in the archives of the French Foreign Office. "Let us add," says the Temps, "that in the course of the interview which he had with Lloyd George at Folkestone a few days after the copy of the letter came into his possession that M. Ribot handed a copy of this copy to the British Premier. A little later in the interview which took place at St. Jean de Maurienne, in Savoy, between the chiefs of the British, French, and Italian Cabinets the question was raised as to what should be done in case the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet took steps toward peace negotiations. An agreement was come to without difficulty between the Allies as to the line of conduct to be adopted in such an eventuality. Let us add that this first letter sent to Prince Sixte had determined the Allies to ask for further explanations, as the result of which Prince Sixte received from his imperial brother-in-law a second letter, which was also communicated to M. Poincaré and M. Ribot. We have no right to give any indication on this subject, but we believe we can state that this second letter was regarded unanimously by the Allies as of such a nature that it would not permit them to pursue the conversations further."

Kaiser Wilhelm in the following telegram accepted without reserve Emperor Charles's statement that the Sixtus letter had been distorted:

Accept my heartiest thanks for your telegram, in which you repudiate as entirely baseless the assertion of the French Premier regarding your attitude toward French claims to Alsace-Lorraine, and in which you once again accentuate the solidarity of interest existing between us and our respective empires. I hasten to inform you that in my eyes there was no need whatever for any such assurance on your part, for I was not for a moment in doubt that you have made our cause your own, in the same measure as we stand for the rights of your monarchy. The heavy but successful battles of these years have clearly demonstrated this fact to every one who wants to see. They have only drawn the bonds close together. Our enemies, who are unable to do anything against us in honorable warfare, do not recoil from the most sordid and the lowest methods. We must, therefore, put up with it, but all the more is it our duty ruthlessly to grapple with and beat the enemy in all the theatres of war. In true friendship, WILHELM.

As a sequel to the matter it was reported from Vienna that the mother of Empress Zita and Prince Sixtus had been compelled to leave Vienna and live in retirement at her estates, remote from the Austrian capital.

THE ISSUES IN IRELAND

Official Report of the Irish Convention—Full Text of the Chairman's Summary of the Proceedings

The Irish home-rule question, in consequence of the failure of the Irish Convention to agree, became an important war issue in the Spring of 1918 on account of its effect upon Great Britain's man-power measures.

Premier Lloyd George, on May 21, 1917, announced the Government's decision to summon a convention of Irishmen representing all parties and interests to endeavor to reach an agreement on the home-rule question. The Sinn Feiners refused to send representatives, but all other factions were represented in the convention, which met July 25, 1917, at Dublin and elected Sir Horace Plunkett Chairman. The report of its recommendations was made public April 13, 1918, in three separate documents—the proposals for a scheme of Irish self-government, adopted by vote of 44 to 29 in a total membership of 90; a protest by the Ulster Unionist delegates, who dissented from any agreement, and the report of 22 Nationalist delegates, who were unable to agree to the fiscal proposals. The majority proposals were accepted by practically all the Nationalists, all the Southern Unionists, and 5 out of 7 of the Labor representatives.

The summary of the proceedings, presented by Sir Horace Plunkett, and the scheme of government as agreed upon by the majority, are of importance historically for a comparison with subsequent measures of home rule, which the British Government announces it intends to introduce before putting into force conscription in Ireland.

THE CHAIRMAN'S SUMMARY

Sir Horace Plunkett's letter reads:

Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith the report of the proceedings of the Irish Convention. For the immediate object of the Government the report tells all that needs to be told:

It shows that in the convention, while it was not found possible to overcome the objections of the Ulster Unionists, a majority of Nationalists, all the Southern Unionists, and five out of the seven Labor representatives were agreed that the scheme of Irish self-government set out in Paragraph 42 of the report should be immediately passed into law. A minority of Nationalists propose a scheme which differs in only one important particular from that of the majority. The convention has, therefore, laid a foundation of Irish agreement unprecedented in history.

I recognize that action in Parliament upon the result of our deliberations must largely depend upon public opinion. Without a knowledge of the circumstances which, at the termination of our proceedings, compelled us to adopt an unusual method of presenting the results of our deliberations, the public might be misled as to what has actually been achieved. It is, therefore, necessary to explain our procedure.

Adopting the Report

We had every reason to believe that the Government contemplated immediate legislation upon the results of our labors. The work of an Irish settlement, suspended at the outbreak of the war, is now felt to admit of no further postponement. In the dominions and in the United States, as well as in other allied countries, the unsettled Irish question is a disturbing factor both in regard to war effort and peace aims. Nevertheless, urgent as our task was, we could not complete it until every possibility of agreement had been explored. The moment this point was reached—and you will not be surprised that it took us eight months to reach it—we decided to issue our report with the least possible delay. To do this we had to avoid further controversy and protracted debate. I was, therefore, on March 22, instructed to draft a report which should be a mere narrative of the convention's proceedings, with a statement, for the information of the Government, of the conclusions adopted, whether unanimously or by majorities.

It was hoped that this report might be unanimously signed; and it was understood that any groups or individuals would be free to append to it such statements as they deemed necessary to give expression to their views. The draft report was circulated on March 30, and discussed and amended on April 4 and 5. The accuracy of the narrative was not challenged, though there was considerable difference of opinion as to the relative prominence which should be given to some parts of the proceedings. As time pressed, it was decided not to have any discussion upon a majority report, nor upon any minority reports or other statements which might be submitted. The draft report was adopted by a majority, and the Chairman and Secretary were ordered to sign it and forward it to the Government. A limit of twenty-four hours was, by agreement, put upon the reception of any other reports or statements, and in the afternoon of April 5 the convention adjourned sine die.

The public is thus provided with no majority report, in the sense of a reasoned statement in favor of the conclusions upon which the majority are agreed, but is left to gather from the narrative of proceedings what the contents of such a report would have been. On the other hand, both the Ulster Unionists and a minority of the Nationalists have presented minority reports covering the whole field of the convention's inquiry. The result of this procedure is to minimize the agreement reached, and to emphasize the disagreement. In these circumstances I conceive it to be my duty as Chairman to submit such explanatory observations as are required to enable the reader of the report and the accompanying documents to gain a clear idea of the real effect and significance of the convention's achievement.

I may assume a knowledge of the broad facts of the Irish question. It will be agreed that of recent years the greatest obstacle to its settlement has been the Ulster difficulty. There seemed to be two possible issues to our deliberations. If a scheme of Irish self-government could be framed to which the Ulster Unionists would give their adherence, then the convention might produce a unanimous report. Failing such a consummation, we might secure agreement, either complete or substantial, between the Nationalist, the Southern Unionist, and the Labor representatives. Many entertained the hope that the effect of such a striking and wholly new development would be to induce Ulster to reconsider its position.

Ulster Issue Unsolved

Perhaps unanimity was too much to expect. Be this as it may, neither time nor effort was spared in striving for that goal, and there were moments when its attainment seemed possible. There was, however, a portion of Ulster where a majority claimed that, if Ireland had the right to separate herself from the rest of the United Kingdom, they had the same right to separation from the rest of Ireland. But the time had gone by when any other section of the Irish people would accept the partition of their country, even as a temporary expedient. Hence, the Ulster Unionist members in the convention remained there only in the hope that some form of home rule would be proposed which might modify the determination of those they represented to have neither part nor lot in an Irish Parliament. The Nationalists strove to win them by concessions, but they found themselves unable to accept any of the schemes discussed, and the only scheme of Irish government they presented to the convention was confined to the exclusion of their entire province.

Long before the hope of complete unanimity had passed, the majority of the convention were considering the possibilities of agreement between the Nationalists and the Southern Unionists. Lord Midleton was the first to make a concrete proposal to this end. The report shows that in November he outlined to the Grand Committee and in December brought before the convention what looked like a workable compromise. It accepted self-government for Ireland. In return for special minority representation in the Irish Parliament, already conceded by the Nationalists, it offered to that Parliament complete power over internal legislation and administration, and, in matters of finance, over direct taxation and excise. But, although they agreed that the customs revenue should be paid in to the Irish Exchequer, the Southern Unionists insisted upon the permanent reservation to the Imperial Parliament of the power to fix the rates of customs duties. By far the greater part of our time and attention was occupied by this one question, whether the imposition of customs duties should or should not be under the control of the Irish Parliament. The difficulties of the Irish Convention may be summed up in two words—Ulster and Customs.

Customs and Excise Problem

The Ulster difficulty the whole world knows; but how the customs question came to be one of vital principle, upon the decision of which depended the amount of agreement that could be reached in the convention, needs to be told. The tendency of recent political thought among constitutional Nationalists has been toward a form of government resembling as closely as possible that of the dominions, and, since the geographical position of Ireland imposes obvious restrictions in respect of naval and military affairs, the claim for dominion home rule was concentrated upon a demand for unrestricted fiscal powers. Without separate customs and excise Ireland would, according to this view, fail to attain a national status like that enjoyed by the dominions.

Upon this issue the Nationalists made a strong case, and were able to prove that a considerable number of leading commercial men had come to favor fiscal autonomy as part of an Irish settlement. In the present state of public opinion in Ireland it was feared that without customs no scheme the convention recommended would receive a sufficient measure of popular support to secure legislation. To obviate any serious disturbance of the trade of the United Kingdom the Nationalists were prepared to agree to a free-trade arrangement between the two countries. But this did not overcome the difficulties of the Southern Unionists, who on this point agreed with the Ulster Unionists. They were apprehensive that a separate system of customs control, however guarded, might impair the authority of the United Kingdom over its external trade policy. Neither could they consent to any settlement which was, in their judgment, incompatible with Ireland's full participation in a scheme of United Kingdom federation, should that come to pass.

It was clear that by means of mutual concessions agreement between the Nationalists and the Southern Unionists could be reached on all other points. On this important point, however, a section of the Nationalists, who have embodied their views in a separate report, held that no compromise was possible. On the other hand, a majority of the Nationalists and the whole body of Southern Unionists felt that nothing effective could result from their work in the convention unless some understanding was reached upon customs which would render an agreement on a complete scheme attainable. Neither side was willing to surrender the principle; but both sides were willing, in order that a Parliament should be at once established, to postpone a legislative decision upon the ultimate control of customs and excise. At the same time each party has put on record, in separate notes subjoined to the report, its claim respecting the final settlement of this question. A decision having been reached upon the cardinal issue, the majority of the convention carried a series of resolutions which together form a complete scheme of self-government.

Parliament for All Ireland

This scheme provides for the establishment of a Parliament for the whole of Ireland, with an Executive responsible to it, and with full powers over all internal legislation, administration, and direct taxation. Pending a decision of the fiscal question, it is provided that the imposition of duties of customs and excise shall remain with the Imperial Parliament, but that the whole of the proceeds of these taxes shall be paid into the Irish Exchequer. A joint Exchequer Board is to be set up to determine the Irish true revenue, and Ireland is to be represented upon the Board of Customs and Excise of the United Kingdom.

The principle of representation in the Imperial Parliament was insisted upon from the first by the Southern Unionists, and the Nationalists conceded it. It was felt, however, that there were strong reasons for providing that the Irish representatives at Westminster should be elected by the Irish Parliament rather than directly by the constituencies, and this was the arrangement adopted.

It was accepted in principle that there should be an Irish contribution to the cost of imperial services, but owing to lack of data it was not found possible in the convention to fix any definite sum.

It was agreed that the Irish Parliament should consist of two houses—a Senate of sixty-four members and a House of Commons of 200. The principle underlying the composition of the Senate is the representation of interests. This is effected by giving representation to commerce, industry, and labor, the County Councils, the Churches, learned institutions, and the peerage. In constituting the House of Commons the Nationalists offered to guarantee 40 per cent. of its membership to the Unionists. It was agreed that, in the south, adequate representation for Unionists could only be secured by nomination; but, as the Ulster representatives had informed the convention that those for whom they spoke could not accept the principle of nomination, provision was made in the scheme for an extra representation of Ulster by direct election.

The majority of the Labor representatives associated themselves with the Nationalists and Southern Unionists in building up the Constitution, with the provisions of which they found themselves in general agreement. They frankly objected, however, to the principle of nomination and to what they regarded as the inadequate representation of Labor in the upper house. Throughout our proceedings they helped in every way toward the attainment of agreement. Nor did they press their own special claims in such a manner as to make more difficult the work, already difficult enough, of agreeing upon a Constitution.

Knottiest Question in History

I trust I have said enough to enable the reader of this report and the accompanying documents to form an accurate judgment upon the nature and difficulties of the task before the convention and upon its actual achievement. While, technically, it was our function to draft a Constitution for our country, it would be more correct to say that we had to find a way out of the most complex and anomalous political situation to be found in history—I might almost say in fiction. We are living under a system of government which survives only because the act abolishing it cannot, consistently with Ministerial pledges, be put into operation without further legislation no less difficult and controversial than that which it has to amend. While the responsibility for a solution to our problem rests primarily with the Government, the convention found itself in full accord with your insistence that the most hopeful path to a settlement was to be found in Irish agreement. In seeking this—in attempting to find a compromise which Ireland might accept and Parliament pass into law—it has been recognized that the full program of no party could be adopted. The convention was also bound to give due weight to your opinion that to press for a settlement at Westminster, during the war, of the question which, as I have shown, had been a formidable obstacle to agreement would be to imperil the prospect of the early establishment of self-government in Ireland.

Notwithstanding the difficulties with which we were surrounded, a larger measure of agreement has been reached upon the principle and details of Irish self-government than has yet been attained. Is it too much to hope that the scheme embodying this agreement will forthwith be brought to fruition by those to whose call the Irish Convention has now responded? I have the honor to be, Sir, your obedient servant,

HORACE PLUNKETT.

April 8, 1918.

THE MAJORITY REPORT

The proposed scheme of Irish self-government referred to in Sir Horace Plunkett's letter is set out below, the majorities by which each section or subsection was carried being indicated in parentheses:

The Irish Parliament. (51 votes to 18.)

(1) The Irish Parliament to consist of the King, an Irish Senate, and an Irish House of Commons.

(2) Notwithstanding the establishment of the Irish Parliament or anything contained in the Government of Ireland act, the supreme power and authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom shall remain unaffected and undiminished over all persons, matters, and things in Ireland and every part thereof.

Powers of the Irish Parliament. The Irish Parliament to have the general power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Ireland, subject to the exclusions and restrictions specified in 3 and 4 below. (51 to 19.)

Exclusions from Power of Irish Parliament. (49 to 16.) The Irish Parliament to have no power to make laws on the following matters:

(1) Crown and succession.

(2) Making of peace and war, (including conduct as neutrals.)

(3) The army and navy.

(4) Treaties and foreign relations, (including extradition.)

(5) Dignities and titles of honor.

(6) Any necessary control of harbors for naval and military purposes, and certain powers as regards lighthouses, buoys, beacons, cables, wireless terminals, to be settled with reference to the requirements of the military and naval forces of his Majesty in various contingencies. (41 to 13.)

(7) Coinage; legal tender; or any change in the standard of weights and measures.

(8) Copyright or patent rights.

Temporary and Partial Reservation. The Imperial and Irish Governments shall jointly arrange, subject to imperial exigencies, for the unified control of the Irish police and postal services during the war, provided that as soon as possible after the cessation of hostilities the administration of these two services shall become automatically subject to the Irish Parliament. (37 to 21.)

Restriction on Power of Irish Parliament on Matters Within Its Competence. (46 to 15.)

(1) Prohibition of laws interfering with religious equality. N. B.—A subsection should be framed to annul any existing legal penalty, disadvantage, or disability on account of religious belief. Certain restrictions still remain under the act of 1829.

(2) Special provision protecting the position of Freemasons.

(3) Safeguard for Trinity College and Queen's University similar to Section 42 of act.

(4) Money bills to be founded only on Vice-regal message.

(5) Privileges, qualifications, &c., of members of Irish Parliament to be limited as in act.

(6) Rights of existing Irish officers to be safeguarded.

Constitutional Amendments. Section 9 (4) of the act of 1914 to apply to the House of Commons with the substitution of "ten years" for "three years." The constitution of the Senate to be subject to alteration after ten years, provided the bill is agreed to by two-thirds of the total number of members of both houses sitting together. (46 to 15.)

Executive Authority. The executive power in Ireland to continue vested in the King, but exercisable through the Lord Lieutenant on the advice of an Irish Executive Committee in the manner set out in act. (45 to 15.)

Dissolution of Irish Parliament. The Irish Parliament to be summoned, prorogued, and dissolved as set out in act. (45 to 15.)

Assent to Bills. Royal assent to be given or withheld as set out in act with the substitution of "reservation" for "postponement." (45 to 15.)

Constitution of the Senate. (48 votes to 19.) Lord Chancellor, 1; four Archbishops or Bishops of the Roman Catholic Church, 4; two Archbishops or Bishops of the Church of Ireland, 2; a representative of the General Assembly, 1; the Lord Mayors of Dublin, Belfast, and Cork, 3; peers resident in Ireland, elected by peers resident in Ireland, 15; nominated by Lord Lieutenant—Irish Privy Councilors of at least two years' standing 4, representatives of learned institutions 3, other persons 4; representatives of commerce and industry, 15; representatives of labor, one for each province, 4; representatives of County Councils, two for each province, 8—64.

On the disappearance of any nominated element in the House of Commons an addition shall be made to the numbers of the Senate.

Constitution of the House of Commons. (45 to 20.)

(1) The ordinary elected members of the House of Commons shall number 160.

(2) The University of Dublin, the University of Belfast, and the National University shall each return two members. The graduates of each university shall form the constituency.

(3) Special representation shall be given to urban and industrial areas by grouping the smaller towns and applying to them a lower electoral quota than that applicable to the rest of the country.

(4) The principle of proportional representation, with the single transferable vote, shall be observed wherever a constituency returns three or more members. (47 to 22.)

(5) The convention accept the principle that 40 per cent. of the membership of the House of Commons shall be guaranteed to Unionists. In pursuance of this, they suggest that, for a period, there shall be summoned to the Irish House of Commons twenty members nominated by the Lord Lieutenant, with a view to the due representation of interests not otherwise adequately represented in the provinces of Leinster, Munster, and Connaught, and that twenty additional members shall be elected by Ulster constituencies, to represent commercial, industrial, and agricultural interests.

(6) The Lord Lieutenant's power of nomination shall be exercised subject to any instructions that may be given by his Majesty the King.

(7) The nominated members shall disappear in whole or in part after fifteen years, and not earlier, notwithstanding anything contained in Clause 5.

(8) The extra representation in Ulster not to cease except on an adverse decision by a three-fourths majority of both houses sitting together. (27 to 20.)

(9) The House of Commons shall continue for five years unless previously dissolved.

(10) Nominated members shall vacate their seats on a dissolution but shall be eligible for renomination. Any vacancy among the nominated members shall be filled by nomination.

Money Bills. (45 to 22.)

(1) Money bills to originate only in the House of Commons, and not to be amended by the Senate. (Act, Section 10.)

(2) The Senate is, however, to have power to bring about a joint sitting over money bills in the same session of Parliament.

(3) The Senate to have power to suggest amendments, which the House of Commons may accept or reject as it pleases.

Disagreement Between Houses. Disagreements between the two houses to be solved by joint sittings as set out in act, with the proviso that if the Senate fail to pass a money bill such joint sitting shall be held in the same session of Parliament. (45 to 22.)

Representation at Westminster.

(1) Representation in Parliament of the United Kingdom to continue. Irish representatives to have the right of deliberating and voting on all matters.

(2) Forty-two Irish representatives shall be elected to the Commons House of the Parliament of the United Kingdom in the following manner:

A panel shall be formed in each of the four provinces of Ireland, consisting of the members for that province in the Irish House of Commons, and one other panel shall be formed consisting of members nominated to the Irish House of Commons. The number of representatives to be elected to the Commons House of the Imperial Parliament shall be proportionate to the numbers of each panel and the election shall be on the principle of proportional representation. (42 to 24.)

(3) The Irish representation in the House of Lords shall continue as at present unless and until that chamber be remodeled, when the matter shall be reconsidered by the Imperial and Irish Parliaments. (44 to 22.)

Finance. (51 to 18.)

(1) An Irish Exchequer and Consolidated Fund to be established and an Irish Controller and Auditor General to be appointed as set out in act.

(2) If necessary, it should be declared that all taxes at present leviable in Ireland should continue to be levied and collected until the Irish Parliament otherwise decides.

(3) The necessary adjustments of revenue as between Great Britain and Ireland during the transition period should be made.

Financial Powers of the Irish Parliament.

(1) The control of customs and excise by an Irish Parliament is to be postponed for further consideration until after the war, provided that the question of such control shall be considered and decided by the Parliament of the United Kingdom within seven years after the conclusion of peace. For the purpose of deciding in the Parliament of the United Kingdom the question of the future control of Irish customs and excise, a number of Irish representatives proportioned to the population of Ireland shall be called to the Parliament of the United Kingdom. (38 to 34.)

(2) On the creation of an Irish Parliament, and until the question of the ultimate control of the Irish customs and excise services shall have been decided, the Board of Customs and Excise of the United Kingdom shall include a person or persons nominated by the Irish Treasury. (39 to 33.)

(3) A Joint Exchequer Board, consisting of two members nominated by the Imperial Treasury, and two members nominated by the Irish Treasury, with a Chairman appointed by the King, shall be set up to secure the determination of the true income of Ireland. (39 to 33.)

(4) Until the question of the ultimate control of the Irish customs and excise services shall have been decided, the revenue due to Ireland from customs and excise, as determined by the Joint Exchequer Board, shall be paid into the Irish Exchequer. (38 to 30.)

(5) All branches of taxation, other than customs and excise, shall be under the control of the Irish Parliament. (38 to 30.)

Imperial Contribution. The principle of such a contribution is approved. (Unanimously.)

Land Purchase. The convention accept the recommendations of the Sub-Committee on Land Purchase. (Unanimously.)

Judicial Power. (43 to 17.) The following provisions of the Government of Ireland act to be adopted:

(a) Safeguarding position of existing Irish Judges.

(b) Leaving appointment of future Judges to the Irish Government and their removal to the Crown on address from both houses of Parliament.

(c) Transferring appeals from the House of Lords to the Judicial Committee, strengthened by Irish Judges.

(d) Extending right of appeal to this court.

(e) Provision as to reference of questions of validity to Judicial Committee.

The Lord Chancellor is not to be a political officer.

Lord Lieutenant. The Lord Lieutenant is not to be a political officer. He shall hold office for six years, and neither he nor the Lords Justices shall be subject to any religious disqualification. His salary shall be sufficient to throw the post open to men of moderate means. (43 to 17.)

Civil Service. (42 to 18.)

(1) There shall be a Civil Service Commission consisting of representatives of Irish universities which shall formulate a scheme of competitive examinations for admission to the public service, including statutory administrative bodies, and no person shall be admitted to such service unless he holds the certificate of the Civil Service Commission.

(2) A scheme of appointments in the public service, with recommendations as to scales of salary for the same, shall be prepared by a commission consisting of an independent Chairman of outstanding position in Irish public life, and two colleagues, one of whom shall represent Unionist interests.

(3) No appointments to positions shall be made before the scheme of this commission has been approved.

Deferring Taking Over Certain Irish Services.

Arrangements to be made to permit the Irish Government, if they so desire, to defer taking over the services relating to Old-Age Pensions, National Insurance, Labor Exchanges, Post Office Trustee Savings Banks, and Friendly Societies. (43 to 18.)

The final division on the question of the adoption of the report as a whole was as follows:

FOR (44)

E. H. Andrews
M. K. Barry
J. Bolger
W. Broderick
J. Butler
J. J. Clancy
J. J. Coen
D. Condren
P. Dempsey
Earl of Desart
J. Dooly
Captain Doran
Archbishop of Dublin
Lord Mayor of Dublin
T. Fallon
J. Fitzgibbon
Sir W. Goulding
M. Governey
Earl of Granard
Captain Gwynn
T. Halligan
A. Jameson
W. Kavanagh

Alderman McCarron
M. McDonogh
J. McDonnell
C. McKay
A. R. MacMullen
Viscount Midleton
J. Murphy
J. O'Dowd
C. P. O'Neill
Lord Oranmore and Browne
Dr. O'Sullivan
J. B. Powell
T. Power
Provost of Trinity College
Sir S. B. Quin
D. Reilly
M. Slattery
G. F. Stewart
R. Waugh
H. T. Whitley
Sir B. Windle

AGAINST (29)

Duke of Abercorn
Sir R. N. Anderson
H. B. Armstrong
H. T. Barrie
Lord Mayor of Belfast
Archbishop of Cashel
Sir G. Clark
Colonel J. J. Clark
Lord Mayor of Cork
Colonel Sharman-Crawford
Bishop of Down and Connor
T. Duggan
H. Garahan
J. Hanna

M. E. Knight
Marquis of Londonderry
J. S. McCance
Sir C. McCullagh
J. McGarry
H. G. MacGeagh
J. McHugh
Moderator General Assembly
W. M. Murphy
P. O'H. Peters
H. M. Pollock
Bishop of Raphoe
T. Toal
Colonel Wallace
Sir W. Whitla

ULSTER UNIONISTS' REPORT

Nineteen Ulster Unionists signed a dissenting report in which they declared that it had soon become evident to them that no real approach to agreement was possible, as the Nationalists put it beyond doubt that what they wanted was "full national independence," or a Parliament possessing co-equal powers with those of the Imperial Parliament. If the Ulster Unionists had anticipated this at the outset, their report explained, they "could not have agreed to enter the convention." Objection was taken to the Nationalist scheme, which aimed at denying the right of the Imperial Parliament to impose military service in Ireland "unless with the consent of the proposed Irish Parliament."

Dr. Mahaffy, Provost of Trinity College, Dublin, and the Archbishop of Armagh, in a separate note, stated that they found it impossible to vote for the majority proposals, since these involved, in their opinion, either the coercion of Ulster, which was unthinkable, or the partition of Ireland, which would be disastrous.

Twenty-two Nationalists, including Joseph Devlin, M. P., the Archbishop of Cashel, the Bishop of Raphoe, the Bishop of Down and Connor, and the Lord Mayors of Dublin and Cork, signed a report favoring a subordinate Irish Parliament with immediate full powers of taxation.

The majority of the Nationalists also signed a note explaining that for the sake of reaching an agreement with the Unionists they did not press their claim for full fiscal autonomy.

The Southern Unionists, who for "high considerations of allied and imperial interests" signed the majority report, also added a note. They insisted that all imperial questions and services, including the levying of customs duties, be left in the hands of the Parliament of the United Kingdom; that Ireland send representatives to Westminster; and that the whole of Ireland participate in any Irish Parliament.

THE FINANCIAL ISSUE

Apart from the main question whether an Irish Parliament with an Executive responsible to it should be established, debate chiefly centred on the question of fiscal autonomy. By January, 1918, it became apparent that on the financial issue there were three clearly defined bodies of opinion:

First—The Ulster Unionists favoring the maintenance of the fiscal unity of the United Kingdom;

Second—A section of Nationalists insisting upon complete fiscal autonomy for Ireland;

Third—The Southern Unionists, supported by other Nationalists, and the majority of the Labor representatives, favoring a compromise which left to Ireland the proceeds of all sources of revenue and the imposition of all taxes other than customs.

It was to overcome these and other differences that Premier Lloyd George invited representatives of the convention to London to confer with the Cabinet. The Premier's letter, dated Feb. 25, 1918, is published in the report. It discloses the fact that some of the Nationalists had been willing to set up an Ulster Committee in the Irish Parliament to veto the application of certain legislation to that province, to make Belfast the headquarters of the Irish Ministry of Commerce, and to let the Irish Parliament meet alternately in Dublin and Belfast.

GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE

Dealing with "the difficult question of customs and excise," Lloyd George wrote:

The Government are aware of the serious objections which can be raised against the transfer of these services to an Irish Legislature. It would be practically impossible to make such a disturbance of the fiscal and financial relations of Great Britain and Ireland in the midst of a great war. It might also be incompatible with that federal reorganization of the United Kingdom in favor of which there is a growing body of opinion. On the other hand, the Government recognize the strong claim that can be made that an Irish Legislature should have some control over indirect taxation as the only form of taxation which touches the great majority of the people, and which in the past has represented the greater part of Irish revenue.

The Government feel that this is a matter which cannot be finally settled at the present time. They therefore suggest for the consideration of the convention that, during the period of the war and for a period of two years thereafter, the control of customs and excise should be reserved to the United Kingdom Parliament; that, as soon as possible after the Irish Parliament has been established, a Joint Exchequer Board should be set up to secure the determination of the true revenue of Ireland—a provision which is essential to a system of responsible Irish government—and to the making of a national balance sheet, and that, at the end of the war, a royal commission should be established to re-examine impartially and thoroughly the financial relations of Great Britain and Ireland, to report on the contribution of Ireland to imperial expenditure, and to submit proposals as to the best means of adjusting the economic and fiscal relations of the two countries.

The Government consider that during the period of the war the control of all taxation other than customs and excise could be handed over to the Irish Parliament; that for the period of the war and two years thereafter an agreed proportion of the annual imperial expenditure should be fixed as the Irish contribution; and that all Irish revenue from customs and excise as determined by the Joint Exchequer Board, after deduction of the agreed Irish contribution to imperial expenditure, should be paid into the Irish Exchequer. For administrative reasons, during the period of the war it is necessary that the police should remain under imperial control, and it seems to the Government to be desirable that for the same period the postal service should be a reserved service.

CONSCRIPTION IN IRELAND

The announcement of the British Government's twofold plan of home rule and conscription for Ireland caused an outpouring of protests from the whole of the Nationalist population. Preparations for resistance were begun, a great anti-conscription fund was opened, resolutions from public bodies began pouring in, and the Sinn Fein clubs renewed their activities.

The most striking feature of the opposition to conscription was that it welded together all the Irish elements represented by the Nationalist Party, the Independent Home Rulers, led by William O'Brien and Timothy Healy; the Sinn Fein, and the Labor organizations, which in recent years had not been very friendly to the Nationalists. Representatives of all these parties were present at a conference in Dublin, held, under the Chairmanship of the Lord Mayor, on April 18. The Catholic Bishops, at a meeting in Maynooth the same day, adopted a declaration against conscription. This meeting was attended by five representatives from the Dublin conference—John Dillon, Edward de Valere, Timothy Healy, a Labor delegate, and the Lord Mayor of Dublin.

A majority of the Nationalist members of the House of Commons decided to abstain from attendance in Parliament during the crisis, thus adopting the attitude of the Sinn Feiners who were elected to the House but have never attended. Fifty-five of the Nationalist members met in Dublin on April 20, with John Dillon presiding, and passed a resolution in which they declared that the enforcement of compulsory military service on a nation without its assent constituted "one of the most brutal acts of tyranny and oppression of which any Government can be guilty."

Fifteen hundred delegates of labor unions met at the Mansion House, Dublin, on April 20, and pledged their resistance to conscription. They also fixed April 23 for the stoppage of all work as an earnest of this resolve and to enable all workers to sign the pledge of resistance. The complete stoppage of work was duly observed on the day mentioned, and passed off for the most part in a quiet and orderly manner.

Sunday, April 21, was observed throughout Catholic Ireland as the day for the administration by the priests of the anti-conscription covenant. From every Catholic pulpit conscription was the subject of discourse, and the action of the Bishops and political leaders was explained. The assemblies where the pledge was taken were generally outside the churches, sometimes in the open air, sometimes in a hall. The practice followed in many cases was for the priest to read the pledge, sentence by sentence, the people reciting after him. In other cases the pledge was given by the raising of hands or the signing of a paper. The Bishops took part with the inferior clergy in administering the pledge, addressing the people and generally warning them against isolated and unconsidered action. They urged obedience to the orders of the recognized leaders, who act in co-operation. All classes, including lawyers, bankers, and merchants, as well as farmers and workmen, took the pledge.

On May 1 an Order in Council was issued by the British Government postponing the operation of the National Service, or conscription, act in Ireland beyond that date, to which it had been previously postponed.

Premier Lloyd George, commenting on the new attitude of the Irish Home Rulers in a letter addressed on May 2 to Irish workers on the Tyneside in England, wrote:

The difficulties have not been rendered easier of settlement by the challenge to supremacy of the United Kingdom Parliament in that sphere, which always has been regarded as properly belonging to it by all advocates of home rule, which recently was issued by the Nationalist Party and the Roman Catholic Hierarchy in concert with the leaders of the Sinn Fein.

While Nationalist and Catholic Ireland had already begun its campaign of resistance to conscription, the Ulster Unionists, under the leadership of Sir Edward Carson, prepared to oppose home rule. Sir Edward Carson declared that the Government had broken its pledges to Ulster by undertaking to pass a Home Rule bill, and on April 24 he advised the Ulster Unionist Council to reorganize its machinery for the impending struggle.

The appointment of Field Marshal Viscount French as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and of Edward Shortt, member of the House of Commons for Newcastle-on-Tyne, as Chief Secretary for Ireland was officially announced on May 5.

Lord French, before his new appointment, was Commander in Chief of the forces in the United Kingdom and had gone to Ireland in that capacity a few days before he became Viceroy. Edward Shortt, in addition to being a Home Ruler, had voted against the extension of conscription to Ireland until an Irish Government had been established.

Greatest Gas Attack of the War

W. A. Willison, Canadian correspondent, cabled from the Picardy front on March 22, 1918:

While British and German troops were struggling far to the south in the opening clash of the Spring campaign, the greatest projector gas bombardment in the world's history was carried out by the Canadians tonight against the enemy positions between Lens and Hill 70. Sharply at 11 o'clock the signal rocket gave notice of the beginning. A moment later over 5,000 drums of lethal gas were simultaneously released from projectors, and were hurled into the enemy territory from the outskirts of Lens, and northward to Cité St. Auguste and the Bois de Dix-Huit.

From his front lines and strong points favoring winds carried the poisonous clouds back upon the enemy's supports, reserves, and assembly areas. The whole of the front was lit up with enemy flares, dimly seen through the heavy mist, while the men in our lines could hear the enemy's gas alarms and cries of distress from the hostile trenches.

Nine minutes later our field artillery, supported by heavy guns and heavy trench mortars, opened up with a slow bombardment, which gradually increased in intensity, until, forty minutes later, the enemy positions were swept with a short, intensive, creeping barrage, which raked his forward and rear areas with high explosive. Caught by our gas without a moment's warning, caught again as he was emerging from his shelters by our artillery, the enemy's casualties must have been very heavy, for the effectiveness of our smaller gas operations has been emphatically proved by the evidence of prisoners.

Tonight's bombardment was three times greater than anything of its kind ever attempted by us on the Western front, and much greater than anything ever launched by the Germans, though the score of the second battle of Ypres and other reckonings are still to be settled, and will be settled.