CHAPTER VIII.

Mr. Fox tries to make peace with France, 1806—Napoleon’s Proclamation—English Order in Council, April 8, 1806—Berlin Decree, Nov. 10, 1806—Its terms, and the stringency of its articles—Napoleon’s skill and duplicity—Russian campaign conceived—Berlin decree enforced—Increased rates of insurance—English Orders in Council, 1807—Preamble of third Order in Council—Terms of this Order—Neutrals—The Orders discussed—Embargo on British ships in Russia—Milan Decree, Dec. 17, 1807—Preamble and articles—Bayonne Decree, April 17, 1808—Effect of the Decrees and Orders in Council in England—Interests of the shipowners maintained—Napoleon infringes his own decrees—Moniteur, Nov. 18, 1810—Rise in the price of produce and freights, partly accounted for by the Orders in Council—Ingenuity of merchants in shipping goods—Smuggling—Licence system in England—Cost of English licences—Their marketable value—Working of the licensing system in England—Simulated papers—Agencies for the purpose of fabricating them.

On the death of Mr. Pitt, January the 23rd, 1806, his great political and rival successor, Mr. Fox, endeavoured to make peace with France, but in vain. Indeed before his own death, which took place the 13th of September the same year, he had become satisfied that any lasting peace with Napoleon was impossible. Having vanquished and humbled two of the greatest powers of Europe, the ambition of the ruler of France grew in proportion to his conquests; his arrogance being only qualified by the reflection that he could not reach England by land, and could not therefore crush her, as he had done so many other European states; in fact, she had proved to be the one stumbling-block between him and universal empire. Unable to reach her with his armies, and frustrated in every attempt to overcome her fleets at sea, he attempted her ruin by means which appeared at the moment more within the reach of one who had overrun Europe with his armies. Thus, he declared to the European Powers that he would not restore any of their territories till England had restored the colonies she had taken during the previous war from France and other countries. Allowing only a brief armistice to the Prussians, and having arranged everything in his own mind, he proclaimed the whole of their ports to be blockaded, and closed those of Hanover against the ships of England and her manufacturers. Defeated by this country in every action at sea, he resolved, if an alliance with all the leading European powers could be secured, to destroy her commerce by a gigantic but impracticable scheme, known as his “continental system,” the one object of which was the exclusion of British ships from every port in Europe.

Conduct so outrageous was not to be endured by even the mild government of Mr. Fox, which, on receipt of the intelligence of the exclusion of the English flag from the harbours of the Elbe, recalled the British ambassador from Berlin, declared the rivers Ems, Weser, Elbe, and Trave, and all Prussian harbours to be in a state of blockade; laid an embargo on every ship of that nation then in British ports, and issued an Order in Council [April 8, 1806] authorizing the seizure of all vessels navigating under Prussian colours, so that before many weeks had elapsed four hundred of its merchant vessels were laid up in the harbours of Great Britain.

These stringent measures were the forerunners of Napoleon’s famous decrees.[264] The redoubtable Berlin decree issued at that city on the 10th of November, 1806, was meant, we must presume, to be only applicable to the countries actually occupied by his armies, including France, Holland, Spain, Italy, and the whole of Germany, although it declared the British Islands to be in a state of blockade.

This extraordinary document set forth that England did not admit the right of nations as universally acknowledged by all civilised peoples; that she declared as an enemy every individual belonging to an enemy’s state, and in consequence made prisoners of war, not only of the crews of armed but also of merchant vessels, and of even their supercargoes; that she applied to merchant vessels and to articles of commerce, the property of private individuals, the right of capture; that she declared ports unfortified, and harbours and mouths of rivers to which she had not sent a single vessel of war, to be blockaded, although a place ought not to be considered blockaded excepting when it is so closely invested that no approach can be made to it without imminent hazard, and that she even declared places blockaded which her united forces would be incapable of blockading, such as entire coasts and a whole empire. It further stated that this unequalled abuse of the right of blockade had no other object than to interrupt the communication of different nations, and to extend the commerce and industry of England upon the ruin of those of the continent; that, this being evidently the design of England, “whoever deals on the continent in English merchandise favours that design and becomes an accomplice; that this conduct of England (worthy of the first ages of barbarism) has benefited her to the detriment of other nations; that it being right to oppose to an enemy the same arms she makes use of, when all ideas of justice, and every liberal sentiment (the result of civilisation among men) are disregarded, we have resolved to enforce against England the usages which she has adopted in her maritime code.”[265] Of course every reader of history knows that many of these charges have no foundation in fact. Nevertheless, Napoleon, then in the plenitude of his power, decreed:—

1. That the British Islands are in a state of blockade.

2. That all commerce and correspondence with them is prohibited, consequently no letters or packets, written in England, or to an Englishman, if written in the English language, shall be despatched from the post-offices, but shall be seized.

3. That every individual, a subject of Great Britain, of whatever rank or condition, who is found in countries occupied by French troops, or those of her allies, shall be made prisoner of war.

4. That every warehouse, and all merchandise or property whatever, belonging to an Englishman, are declared good prize.

5. That one half of the proceeds of merchandise declared to be good prize, and forfeited as in the preceding articles, shall go to indemnify merchants who have suffered losses by the English cruisers.

6. That no vessel coming directly from England, or her colonies, or having been there since the publication of this decree, shall be admitted into any port.

7. That every vessel which, by a false declaration, contravenes the foregoing dispositions, shall be seized, and the ship and cargo confiscated as English property; and that the councils of prizes at Paris and at Milan are authorized to take cognisance of whatever cases might arise in the empire and in Italy, under this article; the whole instrument winding up with orders to communicate its provisions to the kings of Spain, Naples, Holland, Etruria, and to all others the allies of the French, whose subjects, as well as the subjects of France, “were victims of the injuries and barbarity of the English maritime code.”

These extraordinary measures having been long conceived by Napoleon, were now, in the full tide of his continental victories, launched against the commerce of England. It will be seen by the calm perusal of this famous but outrageous document, how well Napoleon knew how to frame his edicts in a form to captivate the multitude, to mask his ulterior objects under the appearance of liberty, and to assume the character of a redresser of the wrongs of nations oppressed by the alleged malignity of England. But his staunchest encomiasts have scarcely dared to justify this atrocious decree, or to support his pretence that it was merely issued to compel the English to renounce the supremacy over the ocean, or to intimidate the agents connected with English shipping, and principally the merchants of the Hanseatic towns, whom he stigmatised as “smugglers by profession,” as they had contrived, in spite of the raging of hostilities, as all merchants will contrive, to pour into the continent every description of merchandise.[266]

M. Thiers states[267] that Talleyrand knew nothing of this decree until it was made public, although Napoleon had despatched extraordinary couriers to the governments of Holland, Spain, and Italy with orders to some, and a peremptory summons to others, to carry it into immediate execution. Indeed Marshal Mortier, who had already invaded Hesse, was ordered to proceed with all speed to the Hanseatic towns, Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck, and to seize not only those towns but the ports of Mecklenberg and of Swedish Pomerania, as far as the mouths of the Oder. He was further instructed, by occupying the rich entrepôts of these towns, to seize all goods of English origin, to arrest the English merchants, to transport to Germany a certain number of seamen taken from the flotilla of Boulogne, in order that they might cruise in boats at the mouths of the Elbe and Weser, and to sink at once every merchant vessel suspected of attempting to run the blockade.

While carrying into effect all over Europe “the continental system,” shadowed forth in this decree, in retaliation, as Napoleon alleged, of the English “paper blockade,” and fulminating his memorable manifesto against England, its author, as is now confessed, was meditating a march to the Vistula, to compel Russia, the only remaining friend and ally of England, to turn against her, while he at the same time attempted to turn the Poles against Russia, by amusing them with the silly notion of the restoration of the kingdom of Poland under the benign protection of France, and to work upon the Sultan of Turkey, with a view to excluding England from the whole of Europe, and thus “to achieve the command of the ocean by land.”

The news of the Berlin decree did not, however, create at first so much alarm as might have been anticipated. Its extreme rigour led the majority of shipowners to believe it could not be enforced; though more prudent parties waited to see the upshot of the affair before they hazarded their cargoes on distant voyages. Matters, consequently, remained in a very uncertain state until March 1807, when enterprising shipowners resumed their shipments. These were carried on to a moderate extent, till August 1807, when it was found to a certainty that the Berlin decree had been put in force, and that, wherever the French could send their custom and excise officers, a number of vessels and cargoes had been seized, so that a virtual suspension of all shipping to the continent took place from that date.

The seizure of various vessels at Antwerp raised the rates of insurance from England to Holland to fifteen, twenty, and thirty guineas per cent., and, at even these exorbitant rates, the greatest difficulty was experienced in effecting an insurance. It was then when her maritime commerce had suffered severely, that the English government resolved to put in force retaliatory measures of an equally stringent character.

The first Order in Council[268] only contained certain regulations under which the trade to and from the enemy’s country should thereafter be carried on. The second order,[269] 17th of January, 1807, set forth that “whereas the sale of ships by a belligerent to a neutral is considered by France to be illegal; and whereas a great part of the shipping of France and of her allies has been protected from capture during the present hostilities by transfers or pretended transfers to neutrals; and whereas it is fully justifiable to adopt the same rule, in this respect, towards the enemy which is applied by the enemy to this country,” his Majesty in Council consequently orders “that in future the sale to a neutral of any vessel belonging to the enemy shall not be deemed to be legal, nor in any manner to transfer the property, nor to alter the character of such vessel; and all vessels now belonging, or which shall hereafter belong, to any enemies of his Majesty, notwithstanding any sale or pretended sale to a neutral, after a reasonable time shall have elapsed for receiving information of this order, at the place where such sale or pretended sale was effected, shall be captured and brought in, and shall be adjudged as lawful prize to the captors.”

The third, and far the most important order, issued on the 11th November, 1807, declared the absolute blockade of his Majesty’s dominions, and of all countries under their control, with certain exceptions which were specified. The much criticised preamble recited that “whereas certain orders establishing an unprecedented system of warfare against this kingdom, and aimed especially at the destruction of its commerce and resources, were some time since issued by the government of France, by which the British Islands were declared to be in a state of blockade, thereby subjecting to capture and condemnation all vessels, with their cargoes, which should continue to trade with his Majesty’s dominions: and whereas by the same orders, all trading in English merchandise is prohibited; and every article of merchandise belonging to England, or coming from her colonies, or of her manufacture, is declared lawful prize:” and whereas “the nations in alliance with France, and under her control, were required to give, and have given, and do give, effect to those orders: and whereas his Majesty’s order of the 9th of January last,[270] has not answered the desired purpose, either of compelling the enemy to recall those orders, or of inducing neutral nations to interpose with effect to obtain their revocation; but, on the contrary, the same have been recently enforced with increased rigour: and whereas his Majesty, under these circumstances, finds himself compelled to take further measures for asserting and vindicating his just rights, and for supporting that maritime power which the exertions and valour of his people have, under the blessing of Providence, enabled him to establish and maintain; and the maintenance of which is not more essential to the safety and prosperity of his Majesty’s dominions, than it is to the protection of such States as still retain their independence, and to the general intercourse and happiness of mankind: his Majesty is therefore pleased” to order “that all ports and places of France, their allies, or of any other country at war with his Majesty, and all other ports and places in Europe, from which, although not at war with his Majesty, the British flag is excluded, and all ports and places in the colonies belonging to the enemy, shall from henceforth be subject to the same restrictions, in point of trade and navigation, with the exceptions hereinafter mentioned, as if the same were actually blockaded by his Majesty’s naval forces in the most strict and vigorous manner.”

All trade in articles or manufactures of such countries was declared unlawful; and “every vessel trading from or to the said countries or colonies, together with all goods and manufactures and merchandise on board, shall be captured and condemned as prize to the captors.[271] His Majesty being desirous, nevertheless, not to subject neutrals to any greater inconvenience than is absolutely inseparable from carrying into effect a just determination to counteract the designs of his enemies, and to retort upon them the consequences of their own violence and injustice, and being yet willing to hope that it may be possible (consistently with that object) still to allow neutrals the opportunity of furnishing themselves with colonial produce for their own consumption and supply; and even to leave open for the present such trade with the enemy as shall be carried on directly with the ports of his Majesty’s dominions, or of his allies,” makes exceptional certain places and points which are there recited.

In this order the falsification of certificates of origin was specially dealt with, and vessels carrying such simulated papers were declared lawful prizes. On the 18th of November another Order in Council was issued approving the draft of instructions to the commanders of H.M. ships of war and privateers to carry out the previous order. On the 25th of November additional orders and instructions were issued, containing supplemental provisions, and specifying the periods at which the Orders in Council of the 11th of November should come into operation at distant ports of the world; and, on the 18th of December, 1807, further supplemental orders were promulgated, all directed to carry out the views of government in the West Indian colonies and in the Mediterranean.[272]

The Order in Council[273] of the 11th of November is referred to even in the present day as a justification of the Berlin Decree. It ought, however, to be remembered, by those who desire to question the character of England for uprightness, that the Prussian government had previously in a forcible and hostile manner taken possession of the electorate of Hanover, and had notified “that all British ships should be excluded from the ports of the Prussian dominions, and from certain other ports in the north of Europe, and not suffered to enter or trade therein;” and had further declared (5th of April, 1806) “that no ship or vessel belonging to any of his Majesty’s subjects be permitted to enter or clear from any ports of Prussia, and that a general embargo or stop be made of all ships and vessels, at that time, or which should hereafter come into any of the ports, harbours, or roads of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, together with all persons and effects on board the said ships and vessels.” Surely, considering the circumstances of the King of Prussia’s perfidy,[274] this Order in Council must be deemed justifiable.

The Order in Council of the 16th May, 1806, whereby all the ports from the Elbe to Brest were declared to be strictly blockaded, contained a proviso “that this blockade shall not extend to neutral vessels having on board merchandise not belonging to the enemies of his Majesty, and not contraband of war; except, however, the coast from Ostend to the mouth of the river Seine, which is hereby declared subject to a blockade of the strictest kind.” This Order in Council, which the French pronounced “barbarous,” and “a paper blockade,” etc., was actually signed by Charles James Fox himself, nor can there be any doubt that the coasts thus declared in a state of blockade were in the strictest sense subject to such declaration, since the perils of leaving the harbours embraced in it were such that hardly any one of even the enemy’s armed vessels ventured to incur them. Considering the circumstances of the times, and that Napoleon was then organising a European confederacy in order to fall upon England with his whole concentrated power, it must be admitted that the Whig Order in Council was not only justifiable by the law of nations, but imperatively called for by expediency. Orders providing for the blockade of harbours and coasts which it was at the moment in the highest degree perilous to enter, and for the interim detention of the Prussian cargoes, in retaliation for the unprovoked invasion of Hanover by the Prussian troops, and the exclusion of British commerce, all brought about by the direct intrigues of Napoleon, were clearly within the law of nations, and, moreover, seem now to have been, at the time and under the circumstances, a very moderate exercise of the rights of a belligerent. To attempt to palliate the Berlin Decrees on the grounds of the “barbarous” character of the previous Orders in Council, was obviously “a weak invention” of the enemy.[275]

Russia having been bribed by the acquisition of Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia, followed the example of Prussia, and lost no time in breaking off all intercourse with England. On the 28th of August the Emperor Alexander laid an embargo on every English ship then in the Russian ports. Napoleon returned for a short time to Paris, proceeding thence to Italy, and, on the 17th of December, 1807, issued from Milan the second celebrated Decree, a fitting supplement to the Berlin Decree of the year previous: this Decree was couched in the following terms:—

“Napoleon, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, and Protector of the Rhenish Confederation(!): observing the measures adopted by the British government, on the 11th of November last, by which vessels belonging to neutral, friendly, or even Powers, the allies of England, are made liable not only to be searched by English cruisers, but to be compulsorily detained in England, and to have a tax laid on them of so much per cent. on the cargo, to be regulated by the English Legislature: observing further that by these acts the British government denationalises the ships of every nation in Europe; that it is not competent for any government to detract from its own independence and rights, all the sovereigns in Europe having in trust the sovereignties and independence of their flag; that if by unpardonable weakness, which in the eyes of posterity would be an indelible stain, such a tyranny was allowed to be established into principles and consecrated by usage, the English would avail themselves of it to assert it as a right, as they have availed themselves of the tolerance of governments to establish the infamous principle that the flag of a nation does not cover goods, and to give to their right of blockade an arbitrary extension which infringes the sovereignty of every State: we have decreed, and do decree as follows:

“1. Every ship, to whatever nation it may belong, which shall have submitted to be searched by an English ship, or made a voyage to England, or shall have paid any tax whatsoever to the English government, is thereby, and for that alone, declared to be denationalised, to have forfeited the protection of its own king, and to have become English property.

“2. Whether the ships thus denationalised by the arbitrary measures of the English government enter into our ports or those of our allies, or whether they fall into the hands of our ships of war or of our privateers, they are declared to be good and lawful prizes.

“3. The British Islands are declared to be in a state of blockade, both by land and sea. Every ship, of whatever nation, or whatsoever the nature of its cargo may be, that sails from the ports of England, or those of the English colonies, and of the countries occupied by English troops, is good and lawful prize as contrary to this decree, and may be captured by our ships of war, or our privateers, and adjudged to the captor.

“4. These measures, which are resorted to only in just retaliation of the barbarous system adopted by England, which assimilates its legislation to that of Algiers, shall cease to have any effect with respect to all nations who shall have the firmness to compel the English government to respect their flag. They shall continue to be vigorously in force as long as that government does not return to the principle of the law of nations, which regulates the relations of civilised states in a state of war. The provisions of the present decree shall be abrogated and null in fact as soon as the English abide again by the principles of the law of nations, which are also the principles of justice and honour.”

It may here be conveniently added, that by a further decree of the 17th of April, 1808,[276] dated at Bayonne, all American vessels, then in the ports of France, and such as should come in thereafter, were ordered to be seized.

Such was the tenor of these extraordinary manifestoes; and the history of the world furnishes no example of similar violations of the ordinary rules which influence the conduct of civilised nations, even in the fury of the most internecine hostilities.

The policy of these decrees became the battle-ground of party in England during several successive years. In fact they affected so many powerful classes in so many different ways, that it was natural that in a parliamentary government, not then always acting from the most disinterested motives, a great party clamour should be created. Nor, indeed, can it be doubted that the Berlin Decrees, and still more the Milan and Bayonne Decrees, struck a heavy blow at the American neutral trade; while, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that the merchants of England carried on a profitable clandestine trade with the continent through the intermediation of neutral ships, chiefly American. This commerce Napoleon resolved to destroy at the hazard of risking a war with the United States; and by the policy he pursued in coercing the Americans to resist the English Orders in Council, he achieved two objects: first, he discountenanced and did all he could to suppress a trade which enriched his enemies, and secondly, he fomented a feeling of hostility against England, whereby, as was proved in the sequel, England found a new enemy ranged against her. The merchants connected with America, who had employed their shipping in carrying on a contraband trade with the continent, inveighed loudly against the impolicy and “barbarous tyranny” of the English Orders in Council, and asserted that these were the cause, the original cause, of all the evils which ensued. Yet, in point of fact, those merchants who were not shipowners cared little in what vessels their goods reached the continent so long as the insurance effected secured them from loss, and they could carry on the trade to a profit.

If such a system could have been allowed to prevail, it is obvious that the shipowners of England would have been altogether shut out from carrying on the ordinary trade of the country, and the whole business of the transportation of commodities must have been monopolised by neutral powers, who would reap incalculable benefit from the calamities of the war. Napoleon, discerning clearly the usual practice of the ports of Europe, and the enormous quantity of English goods shipped from England and her colonies in American bottoms, at once struck a blow at this commerce by seizing every vessel belonging to that country then at Antwerp, Bordeaux, and Bayonne, and by burning those in the port of St. Sebastian; nevertheless, the Americans, instead of asserting openly and boldly the independence of their flag, as they did in later years, secretly intrigued with Napoleon to obtain a special immunity from his decrees for their shipping trade with England.

But while Napoleon was vainly fulminating his decrees against England, and putting into motion his whole power in Europe to carry them out, he himself first set the example of their evasion, and for a temporary profit established a system which tended to neutralise the very object he was making so many efforts to accomplish. Scarcely had a few months elapsed after the publication of the Berlin Decree, before it was discovered that a large source of revenue might be opened by granting, at exorbitant prices, licences to import British colonial produce and manufactures.[277]

These licences were granted ostensibly to benefit French manufacture, under the obligation of exporting French or continental produce to an equal amount, a condition, however, which was easily and frequently evaded. In this manner a most lucrative trade was carried on, notwithstanding the exorbitant rates of the licences, and the great additional charges to which the whole transaction was subjected. British manufactures and colonial produce rose to an extravagant price in France, while foreign produce realised almost as greatly enhanced prices in England; so that, although the mass of the people on both sides the Channel suffered deeply from the interruptions caused by the Decrees on the one hand and the numerous Orders in Council on the other, producing great obstructions to the ordinary course of commerce, numerous classes amassed fortunes by these disturbing elements.

To add to the many sufferings the war created and to the confusion these sweeping proclamations had entailed, the price of wheat rapidly advanced in the spring of 1808. The scantiness of the crop of the previous year was beginning to be seriously felt, while apprehension daily increased that the exclusion of the British flag from the trade of the Baltic would cut off from England her supplies of food from that quarter of the world.[278]

But though British ships were to a great extent excluded from the trade of the Baltic, the Orders in Council enabled them in the long run to obtain almost a complete monopoly of the other portions of the carrying trade of the world. England at this time had practically exclusive possession of the East and West Indies; and the colonial produce brought in her vessels was, in spite of the efforts of Bonaparte, distributed at a great profit over the whole of the continent of Europe. It is unnecessary here to enter into a dissertation as to the general effect of a monopoly produced by war on prices or on the interests of the consumer; nor is it necessary to lay down the principle that, in the long run, a state of peace must, in these days at least, prove far more profitable to the shipowner than a state of war. But during the latter period of the great French war, whatever diminution may have taken place in the building of ships, it is certain that at no period was British shipping more prosperous, or employed at higher freights. Scarcely a ship belonging to any other nation could sail without a licence, which, following the example of France, the British government had rendered imperative.[279] The whole of the exportable produce of the East and West Indies, and a large portion of that from South America, now came to the ports of Great Britain, either for consumption or re-exportation; and any effort of Bonaparte to exclude these necessary articles from the continent proved nearly, if not altogether abortive. England now, to all intents and purposes, obtained a monopoly, costly it is true, but she can never again hope to carry on hostilities with any of the great powers of Europe and bring, as it were, under her dominion at the same time all the material riches of the world.[280]

But while the cost of articles imported from the continent of Europe was enhanced by the difficulty of communication, and the circuitous routes it often became necessary to adopt, similar causes raised the price of colonial produce, and of some descriptions of British manufactures, to a still greater proportionate height on the continent, so that the severity with which the decrees of the enemy were enforced operated more directly against imports from England than against exports to that country, and many curious instances besides those we have just mentioned are given of the extraordinary rates paid for freight.[281]

Among the various means devised by the ingenuity and enterprise of adventurers to elude and overcome the obstacles presented by the decrees of the enemy, one in particular, which was resorted to on an extensive scale, deserves mention. Several vessels laden with sugar, coffee, tobacco, cotton-twist, and other valuable commodities were despatched from England at very high rates of freight and insurance to Saloniki, in European Turkey. Refined sugar and other goods were packed in boxes made at a considerable additional expense, so that each package should not exceed about two hundredweight. These, when landed, were conveyed on mules and pack-horses through Servia and Hungary to Vienna, for the purpose of being distributed over Germany, and sometimes even into France. The articles sold at enormously high prices. Sugar fetched 5s. to 6s. per lb.; coffee 7s. per lb.; indigo 18s.; and cotton 7s. and 8s. per lb.[282]

On the 5th September, 1807, the English made themselves masters of the small island of Heligoland (which was confirmed to them by the Treaty of Kiel, January 14th, 1814), and thence enormous quantities of British goods were smuggled into Holstein, and thence again were conveyed at a charge of 33 to 40 per cent. within the French custom-house line. This regular traffic, being well known to the imperial authorities, and sometimes connived at on account of its enormous profits, was alleged as a justification for the sale of licences, especially as Bourrienne, who at that time was resident at Hamburg, had represented to Napoleon that he had much better at once authorize the trade on these terms, and realise for himself this contraband profit. Napoleon adopted the proposal, and in consequence sixty millions of francs (2,400,000l.) worth of English produce was in one year openly imported into that town alone. The same system was adopted in Prussia; while legions of custom-house officers and coastguards were employed to put down contraband trade with the English.

The English government having been unable to resist the importunities of the manufacturing and mercantile interests, could not therefore forbear from following the pernicious example thus set by Napoleon. When the system, though different in many respects, had been fully established in Great Britain, the number of licences issued rose from four thousand nine hundred and ten in 1808, to no fewer than fifteen thousand two hundred and twenty-six in 1809, and eighteen thousand three hundred and fifty-six in the year 1810. Though these licences were professedly regulated upon fixed principles, they were nevertheless a source of jobbery and fraud, and great peculation and corruption prevailed, “a fruitful source,” as Lord Stowell observed, “of simulation and dissimulation from beginning to end.”

Such licences were payable on a graduated scale on imports and exports not transferable, as well as upon transferable exports and imports. The fees received at the Admiralty were for licences to merchant vessels to carry guns; on granting Mediterranean papers; on ships’ fines for loss of papers; on ships’ protection for three months; on protection granted to barges and boats for a similar period; on commissions, warrants, and appointments; on granting letters of marque; and on licences to join convoy; the Privy Council Office charging for licences to trade 4l. 16s. each, besides gratuities, which were divided amongst the clerks.[283] The amount of the fees during the height of the licence system was calculated to yield annually about 100,000l.[284] beyond the public stamp of 1l. 10s. which was added before delivery of the licence.

But the whole system of licences proved utterly indefensible, and, being granted to foreign vessels to the prejudice of English shipping, it grew at last to be altogether intolerable. Beyond the mere amount of fees claimed by the Council Office, the Secretary of State’s fees for the sign-manual were as much again, and even this aggregate amount was frequently exceeded. For instance, it is reported in the ‘Parliamentary Proceedings’ that there was paid by a certain John Lubock for the certificate of one cargo, imported or exported, 15l. 0s. 6d., and for each duplicate, if required, 3l. 12s.; part of this was, however, admitted to be for agency. The charge for a ship going out in ballast to import a cargo of timber from Wilmington, in the United States, was 17l. 2s. 6d. A licence for St. Domingo (special) to trade to and from that island, cost 25l. 1s. 6d. For an order allowing small vessels to trade to and from Holland for six months, the charge for one licence amounted to 15l. 0s. 6d.; but an order for six ships could be obtained for 44l. 5s. 6d. One agent is reported to have paid no less than 3,952l. 7s. 6d. in the course of a year for licences alone.[285]

Sometimes, however, they were estimated at an even extravagant value. Mr. A. Baring said, in the course of a debate in Parliament on the subject, that he would have given 15,000l. for one of the licences issued, which, owing to a clerical error in the substitution of one word for another, became of that marketable value. No wonder that the merchants importuned the government for these licences, when they not only served as a protection to their property, but might, by a lucky error, become the means of making a man’s fortune. In this point of view the licences were wholly and entirely unjustifiable. It seems further that where applications were made, a considerable amount of control and interference were exercised in framing them before they were granted. Mr. Brougham drew a picture of the President and Vice-President of the Board of Trade laying their heads together, and passing a whole morning in determining with the utmost gravity “whether one cargo should consist of cotton or of wool, whether scissors should be added, whether nails should be added to the scissors; whether the nails or the scissors should be left out, or whether the commerce of the country might or might not be ruined by throwing in a little hemp with the nails and the scissors to make up the cargo.”[286] But this was not all.

The licence to sail from port to port, for example, contained the following clause: “The vessel shall be allowed to proceed, notwithstanding all the documents which accompany the ship and cargo may represent the same to be destined to any neutral or hostile port, or to whomsoever such property may belong.” With this licence, the ship which carried it, foreign or British, was enabled to pass through the British fleet; every vessel thus authorized being permitted to take on board another set of papers, which were, in point of fact, a forgery from beginning to end. Should the vessel be overhauled by English cruisers, she nevertheless continued her voyage unmolested. If, for example, she had actually cleared out from London, it was stated in the simulated papers that she had cleared out from Rotterdam. With this view, the proper description was made out as nearly as possible in the handwriting of the Custom-house officer at Rotterdam; and, if it were necessary that the signature of the French minister of state should be affixed, as in the case of Holland, this was skilfully forged, and even the fantastic signature of Napoleon himself was sometimes attached to these forged documents![287] These forgeries were not done perfunctorily or by halves, for not only were the names forged, but the seal was admirably engraved, and the wax closely imitated. Indeed a regular set of letters were frequently also forged, containing a good deal of fictitious private anecdote, with a mixture of such news from Rotterdam as might be supposed to be interesting to mercantile people, together with an imaginary letter from a merchant in Rotterdam to the shipowner.

Thus provided, the vessel set forth from London to encounter the manifold perils of the sea. The most respectable houses in London made application for similar licences, and every merchant who, with the privity of his clerks, sailed a vessel under such circumstances was compelled to become conversant with the humiliating mysteries of this fraudulent trade. But to make matters still worse, the forgeries were confirmed by the solemn oaths of the captain and the crew when they arrived at their destined port. Indeed it had become so common a practice that perjury under such circumstances was not dealt with as a crime, nor was it considered a crime on their part, as their owners compelled them to swear that all their letters and documents were genuine. Every sort of interrogatory was put to the captain and the crew calculated to discover the real port whence the vessel had sailed, and these questions the captain and crew were obliged to evade by numerous false oaths. The feeling that they were doing no wrong could alone have induced them thus to act. They were even obliged to declare from what quarter the wind blew when they left Rotterdam and took a pilot on board, although they were never near the place, together with many other particulars, all confirmed by oath, perjuring themselves at every stage. To such an extent did these frauds prevail that at last they were reduced to a regular system. Individuals formed themselves into established mercantile agencies, in order to facilitate the simulation of these papers. Indeed they openly issued circulars avowing their object. One of these extraordinary productions has been enshrined in a parliamentary debate, Mr. Brougham having published to the world the following “atrocious circular.”[288]

This singular document was accompanied by a list of about a score of places, for which these agents had clearances all ready at the instant for disposal to those merchants who, from the exigencies of the times, found themselves compelled to resort to such practices. Indeed these knaves knew perfectly well that if the merchants of England refused to participate in this “filthy commerce,” the traders in Boston would not have any such scruples, still less those of Pappenburg, or some of the ports of Danish Holstein.