CHAPTER XI.

A special mission sent to England—Concessions made in the Colonial trade—Blockades in the Colonies, and of the French ports in the Channel—The dispute concerning the trade with the French Colonies—What is a direct trade—Reversal of the law in England—Effect in America—Instructions to Commissioners—Proceedings of the shipowners of New York—Duties of neutrals—Views of the New York shipowners—Conditions with respect to private armed vessels—Authorities on the subject—Negotiations for another treaty—Circuitous trade—Commercial stipulations—Violation of treaties—Complaints of the Americans against the French—Language of the Emperor—Bayonne Decree, April 17, 1808—American Non-intervention Act, March 1, 1809—Intrigues in Paris against England—Hostile feelings in United States against England—Diplomatic proceedings in Paris—Convention with Great Britain—Retaliatory Acts to be enforced conditionally—Hostile legislation against Great Britain—Bonds required—Treaty negotiations renewed—Dutch reciprocity—Bremen reciprocity.

Although there is reason to fear that the shipowners of America, having made the profits of a war in Europe a matter of deliberate calculation, paid less attention than they might otherwise have done to the remonstrances of the British government against their piratical acts, they had, on the other hand, some reason for complaining of the conduct of British cruisers. The Americans complained that their vessels were searched on the high seas, not merely for enemies’ goods, but, as already noticed, for seamen to man the British navy, a practice which they alleged was derogatory to them, and tended to destroy all cordial friendship between the two countries. In reply, the English government held that no State had such jurisdiction over its merchant vessels upon the high seas as to prevent a belligerent from searching them for contraband of war, or for the persons and property of enemies; and if, in the exercise of that right, the belligerents should discover on board of a neutral vessel any of their subjects who had withdrawn from their lawful allegiance, they asked upon what grounds could the neutral refuse to give them up.

But the public mind was so inflamed in the United States by stories of thousands of Americans forced to serve in the British Navy; of American ships upon the high seas deprived of their hands by British cruisers, and compelled to put into the nearest port for want of seamen to pursue the voyage; and of other outrages still more extraordinary and unpardonable, that, looking only to the alleged abuses of the right, their popular leaders went to the extreme of denying its existence altogether. A Bill upon this principle was consequently brought into Congress, but it was rejected by the Senate.[321]

When, however, the American government determined to send a special mission to England for the adjustment of differences between the two nations, the British habit of impressing on the high seas was stated as the foremost of the American grievances, and their plenipotentiaries were instructed to urge the abandonment of a practice “so disgraceful and injurious to their country, as the point most essential to its peace, honour, and tranquillity.”

As the second ground of complaint, the alleged violation of neutral rights by seizing and condemning their merchantmen though engaged in lawful commerce, involves a variety of important considerations, which were incessantly the subjects of dispute, it may be desirable to state the substance of the views of the American government and of English jurisconsults on so important a question. England had conceded to the Americans, in the previous war, permission to trade with the colonies of the enemy for articles intended for their own domestic consumption; and in case no market was found in the United States for articles imported with that intention, she had permitted them to re-export those articles to any part of the world not invested by her blockading squadrons. In 1804 certain ports of Martinique and Guadaloupe, French colonies, were declared to be in a state of blockade, and the siege of Curaçoa was also converted into a blockade. In August of the same year a rigorous blockade was declared to be established at the entrances of the ports of Fécamp, St. Valery, Caux, Dieppe, Treport, the Somme, Etaples, Boulogne, Calais, Gravelines, Dunkirk, Nieuport, and Ostend. Bonaparte at that moment was threatening England with invasion, and England was putting forth all her strength to repel the attempt and to circumvent his designs. America looked calmly on, and profited, as we have seen, by the struggle, pushing forward her pretensions and alleged grievances with the view of annoying as much as she could both belligerents, and especially Great Britain. England, as is well known, had constantly refused the Americans permission to trade directly between the colonies of the enemy and the mother-country, but had tolerated the indirect communication above mentioned, on the supposition that the goods so transmitted had been intended originally for American consumption, and would not have been re-exported, but for want of a market in the United States.

“It is now distinctly understood,” said his Majesty’s Advocate-General, in a report officially communicated by Lord Hawkesbury to the American government, and transmitted to all the Vice-Admiralty Courts aboard,[322] “and so decided by our highest tribunals, that the produce of the colonies of the enemy may be imported by a neutral into his own country, and may be re-exported from thence, even to the mother-country of such colony; and in like manner the produce and manufactures of the mother-country may, in this circuitous mode, legally find their way to the colonies. The direct trades, however, between the mother-country and its colonies have not, I apprehend, been recognised as legal, either by his Majesty’s government, or by his tribunals. What is a direct trade, or what amounts to an intermediate importation into a neutral country, may sometimes be a question of some difficulty: a general definition of either, applicable to all cases, cannot well be laid down. The question must depend upon the particular circumstances of each case. Perhaps the mere touching at a neutral country to take fresh clearances may properly be considered as a fraudulent evasion, and as, in effect, the direct trade; but the High Court of Admiralty[323] has expressly decided that landing the goods and paying the duties in the neutral country breaks the continuity of the voyage, and is such an importation as legalises the trade, although the goods be re-shipped in the same vessel, and on account of the same neutral proprietor, and be forwarded for sale to the mother-country or the colony.”

But his Lordship admitted that the decision of Sir William Scott by no means went so far; that distinguished judge remarking in the most guarded manner that it was not his business to determine “what was a bonâ fide importation.” However, from Lord Hawkesbury’s commentary upon the judgment, presuming that he indorsed the Judge-Advocate’s opinion, by sending it to America as an extract, it came to be universally understood in the United States that the mere landing of the goods, and paying the duties in the neutral country, were sufficient to break the continuity of the voyage and to legalise the trade; whereas the landing and the payment of the duties were only deemed the best criteria or the best evidence obtainable of a bonâ fide importation. This distinction became afterwards of great importance, although the peace of Amiens put an end for a time to all controversies on the subject. But when hostilities recommenced between France and England, the American merchants, recollecting the footing on which the trade had been placed at the conclusion of the previous war, embarked in it without apprehension, as a commerce perfectly lawful. An immense amount of tonnage was employed in this trade, which was carried on without interruption till the summer of 1805, when a decision on new grounds was adopted by the English Admiralty Courts, which suddenly, and without the smallest warning, exposed the whole of the American merchant vessels to seizure and condemnation.

It was now decided that the proof of payment of duties in America was no evidence of a bonâ fide importation into that country,[324] because payment of duties did not mean that the duties had been actually paid in money, but that they had been secured by bonds; and from the peculiar system of revenue laws established in the United States, the merchant who re-exported goods previously imported, gained a profit by his transactions with the custom-house, instead of suffering any loss or deduction from his gains. The importer, when the duties were ascertained, gave bonds for the amount; but if the next day he should enter the goods for exportation again, he became entitled to debentures from the custom-house, payable on the same day with the bonds, and made out for the same sums, with a deduction of only three and a half per cent., which was retained for the government. The bonds given originally by the merchant remained unissued in the custody of the revenue officers; while the debentures became an assignable and transferable security for money, capable of being recovered by a summary process; and if the importer failed, enjoyed a priority before all private demands. The result of the whole operation, therefore, was that the government lent to the private credit of the merchant the character of a public security, in lieu of his bonds deposited at the custom-house, and received three and a half per cent. on the amount of these bonds in return for the accommodation it afforded. Now, however admirable this system may be in reference to the trade of the United States, it utterly broke down when adduced as evidence of a bonâ fide importation, or as a proof that the duties had been paid or secured in the United States according to law; as, in point of fact, the merchant gained by repeating the transaction.

The English courts, therefore, acting in perfect consistency with the principle of their former decisions, when these facts were made known to them, refused any longer to admit the payment of duties in America as a proof of a bonâ fide operation. On the other hand, the merchants of America, without looking at the legal grounds of former decisions, had trusted to Lord Hawkesbury’s communication made during the previous war, which led the American government to believe that “landing the goods and paying the duties legalised the trade,” and had consequently embarked their capital and ships in a commerce they felt assured was a legal and permitted trade. When, therefore, they saw their vessels captured by the British cruisers, without any previous warning, and brought into the Vice-Admiralty Courts for adjudication, they naturally complained of the violent and inconsistent conduct of England, and loudly accused her of robbery and injustice. Indignation meetings, as they have since been termed, were convened in all the principal commercial cities of America; declarations and resolutions were voted; and petitions and remonstrances were addressed to the President and Legislature. Congress, as was natural, caught the flame with which it was surrounded, and after a multitude of injudicious and inflammatory resolutions, passed a non-importation Act[325] against the manufactures of Great Britain, to take effect in the ensuing month of November. In the meantime the commissioners sent to negotiate with Great Britain were instructed to obtain from the government a clear and precise rule for regulating their trade with the colonies of the enemy, which should not be liable to be changed by Orders in Council or instructions to cruisers.

Before examining the third point of the complaints urged by the Americans, it will conduce to the general comprehension of the whole scope of the quarrel if reference is made to the proceedings of the merchants and shipowners at New York shortly before this period. It requires very little penetration to perceive that the arming of vessels in the ports of the United States, under pretence of being bound to the East Indies, was a mere cloak for privateering. There were then plenty of freebooters under the American flag, who cared but little which side they espoused, so as they could succeed in a very profitable maritime adventure. In fact their depredations on the seas rose to such a height that Congress was at last compelled to take cognisance of their proceedings, and a Bill was brought forward to restrain merchant vessels of the United States from sailing in an armed condition. The shipowners of New York upon that occasion put upon record their sentiments, and some of the principles they expounded are well deserving reflection and attention. They[326] acknowledged with satisfaction that since the commencement of the existing war the commerce of the United States had not, to their knowledge, suffered any injuries which could justly be attributed to the governments of Europe. They disclaimed explicitly any intention to derive unfair advantages from the misfortunes of the belligerent nations; and they solemnly engaged to support with all their influence any regulations enjoined by treaties or by the established usages of civilised States. They only desired to foster their native genius for enterprise. The duties of neutral merchants, as understood by them, consisted in the observance of the following rules:—

1st. Not to protect under false appearances the ships or property of the subjects of belligerent nations.

2nd. Not to resist reasonable visitation and search by the ships of war of belligerent nations.

3rd. Not to supply either party with articles contraband of war; and,

4th. Not to enter ports in a state of blockade.

They did not consider it a duty or usage of neutral nations to enforce by legal sanction the observance of these rules, but merely to apprise their citizens of the nature of their obligations, arising under treaties or under the general law of nations, by which they would be subjected to such penalties as custom had established. These penalties, the New York merchants asserted, could only be rightfully inflicted by regular tribunals, established by the belligerent nations in such fashion that they should not exceed the right of condemning the property attempted to be illegally concealed or transported: they would, accordingly, cheerfully submit to a law for restraining the armament of private merchantmen, except in conformity with the following principles:

1st. That the vessels should wholly belong to citizens of the United States.

2nd. That the cargoes laden on board such vessels shall wholly belong to citizens of the United States, and except necessary munitions and merchandise to and from ports eastward of the Cape of Good Hope, and westward of Cape Horn, shall in no degree consist of articles declared contraband of war, either by the general law of nations, or by treaties with the United States.

3rd. That the owners of armed vessels be required to give bonds for a reasonable amount that they shall not sell or charter such vessels in the dominions of any foreign state or nation, in America or elsewhere, to the subjects of the belligerent parties.

4th. That the masters and chief officers of all armed vessels be required to give bonds that they will not enter a blockaded port, and that they will not resist lawful visitation and search by a national ship of any European belligerent power; while, if deemed expedient, the masters and chief officers may be further rendered liable to such personal penalties as the wisdom of Congress may prescribe.

It will be seen that the New York merchants, who might then be presumed to represent the most influential body of the shipowners and merchants of the Union, never attempted to impeach any of the principles which had been held by all civilised nations, as establishing the law of nations, especially as regards the right of search. Indeed the highest authorities in the United States have laid down, “that the right of visitation and search of neutral vessels at sea is a belligerent right essential to the exercise of the right of capturing enemy’s property, contraband of war, and vessels committing a breach of blockade.”[327]

Text writers generally concur in recognising the existence of this right. Sir W. Scott remarks, “All writers upon the law of nations unanimously acknowledge it, without the exception of even Hubner himself, the great champion of neutral privileges.” In fact the many European treaties which have reference to this right deal with it as pre-existing, and merely regulate the exercise of it.

These authoritative expositions of the law, as drawn from American as well as European text writers, notwithstanding the long period which has elapsed since the eventful struggle at the commencement of the present century, are the more necessary to be here quoted as there are unfortunately still recurrences of these disputes respecting the exercise of the right of search, and it must be conducive to a good understanding between England and all other nations, that an accurate interpretation of the law of nations should be generally established and observed.

The scope of this work will not admit of entering into all the details of the conferences in respect of the treaty which was shortly afterwards entered into between Great Britain and the United States, and which had become the more necessary after the unfortunate encounter[328] between the Chesapeake and H.M.S. Leopard in Hampton Roads, where England was held by various authorities to be in the wrong. It is now generally admitted that the commissioners on both sides were animated by a sincere desire to establish a firm and lasting friendship between the two countries, on terms mutually advantageous, though it is deeply to be lamented that their efforts at negotiation were at times much thwarted by popular clamour on both sides the water.[329] Considering the state of public opinion in America, and the instructions which they appear to have received from their government, the American commissioners, in particular, evinced in the strongest manner their disposition to conciliation, when, after many fruitless conferences held in the hope of devising some adequate substitute for the practice of impressing on the high seas, they consented, contrary to their instructions, to proceed with the other articles of the treaty, pledging the government of Great Britain “to issue instructions for the observance of the greatest caution in the impressment of seamen, and of the greatest care to preserve citizens of the United States from any molestation or injury, and to afford immediate redress upon any representation of injury sustained by them;” engaging besides at any future period “to entertain the discussion of any plan that should be devised to secure the interests of both States, without any injury to rights to which they are respectively attached.”

In the other questions between the two countries, the negotiators were more fortunate in bringing their labours to a successful issue. On the subject of the circuitous trade permitted to the United States, between the colonies of the enemy and other parts of the world, an article was framed which satisfied the American commissioners. A clear rule for the regulation of that commerce was substituted in place of the uncertain and variable system under which it had been previously conducted. The principle was taken from Lord Hawkesbury’s communication, to which reference has just been made, which defined the difference between a continuous and an interrupted voyage; but, besides requiring that the goods should be landed and the duties paid in the neutral country, this article expressly stipulated that, on re-exportation, there should remain, after the drawback, a duty to be paid of one per cent. ad valorem on all articles of the growth, produce, and manufacture of Europe; and on all articles of colonial produce a duty of not less than two per cent. The maritime jurisdiction of the United States was guaranteed by the 12th article, against the alleged encroachments and violations of his Majesty’s cruisers; and on account of the peculiar circumstances of the American coast, an extension of maritime jurisdiction, to the distance of five miles from shore in American waters, was mutually conceded by both parties, with certain limitations, having reference to other powers, expressed in the treaty.[330]

The commercial stipulations contained in this treaty seem to have been framed on the fairest and most liberal principles of reciprocal advantages to both countries; but before the treaty reached the United States for the requisite ratification, and indeed before it was signed in London, the celebrated Berlin Decree[331] had been issued, and the position of England was thereby very greatly altered in respect to neutrals.

But treaties, in those days of national convulsions, were of little avail; they were too frequently made only to be broken; and from the experience of the past, and the wholesale destruction of the private property alike of neutrals and belligerents during periods of hostility, we may learn that it is unsafe to rely, in similar cases, on the validity and security of any paper pledges without the general guarantee of nations. Although France, as well as England, had entered into treaties of amity with the United States, which were in force between 1803 and 1809 inclusive, no less than thirteen hundred and three American merchant vessels were captured between those dates by the cruisers of both nations.

Although nominally captured under the operations of the French Decrees and English Orders in Council, many of these captures were made in direct violation of existing treaties, and not a few in obedience simply to the will of the Emperor on the one hand, and that of the English Council on the other. Of the five hundred and thirteen American merchantmen taken by the French, and the forty-seven by the Neapolitans, antecedent to the Berlin and Milan Decrees, one hundred and seventy-four were condemned and burnt, four were compromised, and twenty-one acquitted; while two hundred and nine captured during the operation of these decrees were condemned and burnt, thirty-three released or compromised, and eighty-eight altogether acquitted. Of the vessels captured by the Neapolitans, forty-one were confiscated or condemned, two restored, and four not accounted for. In the category of the vessels burnt at sea no fewer than thirty-seven were destroyed in order to keep secret the movements of the French squadron; and a large number because they had touched at ports in England on their way to continental ports, some of them having done so only through stress of weather. To recompense the losses thus sustained, the Americans claimed from the French government eighty millions of francs, a demand which proved so serious a cause of dispute as almost to embroil the two countries in war.

But the captures by the English of American merchant vessels in the same period amounted to seven hundred and forty-five, and of those taken before the issue of the Orders in Council two hundred and forty-three were condemned, one hundred and fifty acquitted, and eighty-eight released; while out of the number subsequently taken two hundred were condemned, one hundred and ninety-one acquitted, and ninety-three restored to their owners.

America, had she had the power, would undoubtedly have resented by force of arms many of these captures; but between two such belligerents she was helpless, and had to submit, though not altogether in silence, to proceedings against her shipowners, too frequently as unjust as they were unjustifiable. While the rigorous enforcement of the right of search on the part of the English, and the decrees of the French excluding from their ports every neutral vessel which had English goods on board, or had touched at any of the ports of that country, remained in force, it was impossible for the shipowners of the United States of America to carry on an oversea trade with any prospect of success. French cruisers, scattered over the seas, with orders to sink or burn any ship which might reveal their route to the English (who, with all their naval force, could not control the immensity of the seas), captured American vessels for contraventions committed a few days after, and sometimes before, the publication of the decrees. As the news of each seizure reached the American minister in Paris, he complained with increasing energy. He invoked the principles alike of international and civil law, appealing to the convention by which the rights of neutrals were guaranteed, forbidding the application of laws until they could have become known, and, in the name of his outraged government, declared that “such proceedings, and the continuation of such acts, could not fail to interrupt the good understanding, which had so long subsisted between the two Powers, and had been mutually advantageous, which it would be unwise to destroy for the sake of pillaging a few merchant vessels.”[332]

But Napoleon understood perfectly well his own policy. Casting aside all those rules which restrain constitutional governments, his aim was to excite the Americans to open war against England; and whilst thus trampling upon the rights of America, the French minister was instructed to proclaim those of neutrals in the name of the Emperor! In a letter from M. Champigny to Mr. Armstrong, 12th Feb., 1808, it is stated that “A merchant vessel is a floating colony; any act of violence committed against such a vessel is an attack on the independence of its government. The seas belong to no nation; they are the common property, the domain of all.” In spite, however, of the enunciation of these just and liberal principles, and while admitting that the Berlin and Milan Decrees were flagrant violations of them, Napoleon incessantly threw the entire blame upon England, who, he alleged, had provoked these orders, and by setting up the indisputable dogma that the independence of the flag was a right common to all powers, he attempted to coerce the Americans into resisting by force the retaliatory measures to which England, in defence of her own commerce, was compelled to resort. Indeed M. de Champigny[333] explicitly says, “the Emperor has no doubt that the United States, considering the position in which England has placed the continent, particularly since its decree of the 11th of November, will declare war against her:” adding, “War does exist, de facto, between England and the United States, and the Emperor considers it as having been declared on the day on which England issued its orders. With this view, the Emperor, willing to consider the United States as engaged in the same cause with all the Powers who have to defend themselves against England, has adopted no definite measure with regard to the American vessels which may have been brought into the French ports. He has ordered them to be retained under sequestration until a determination could be taken with regard to them, which determination would depend upon the disposition manifested by the American government.”

Such language could only be interpreted in one way: “Make war against the mistress of the seas without delay, and then I will consider whether I will release the American vessels which in violation of the laws of nations I have seized.” Language such as this, supported by the tempting promise to restore the American ships he had captured, could only be the result of a deliberately planned policy on the part of Napoleon. By his Bayonne Decree, 17th April, 1808, he had given orders to seize all American vessels then in the ports of France, and such as should come in thereafter; and in an explanatory note of the 25th of April, 1808, addressed to the American minister at Paris, had stated that the decree of the 17th instant directed the seizure of vessels coming into the ports of France after that date, because no vessel of the United States could then navigate the seas without infringing their own laws, thus furnishing a presumption that they did so on British account or in British connection.

Finding that the French seizures were incessant, the American minister at Paris in the beginning of 1808 declared that the conduct of France towards the United States, instead of advancing the views of the Emperor, had an entirely contrary effect, and was calculated to defeat them. Whilst admitting[334] that the United States were ready to go to war with Great Britain for the purpose of avenging certain alleged outrages committed on American rights as a neutral nation, he reminded M. de Champigny that the French had also most grievously invaded those rights, showing at the same time that the reparation of those injuries, by relieving the American property from sequestration, and by renouncing for the future the right of seizure in such cases, would be the most efficient means of forming new and more intimate connections between the United States and France.

As the American shipowners had set at defiance the embargo imposed on the ports of the United States, their government on the 1st of March, 1809, replaced it by the Act of Non-intervention, whereby all intercourse between America, France, and England was interdicted under severe penalties, and the ports of America closed against the armed vessels of both belligerents. In communicating this act to the French government, General Armstrong took care to call special attention to its conditional character, and to disavow all hostile views and intentions, declaring it to be a measure of precaution in order to preserve the vessels of the United States from the numerous dangers to which they were exposed by the continuance of their intercourse with France. He subsequently added that “the Non-intercourse Act was a fresh appeal to the wisdom and justice of the Emperor, as a simple modification of the imperial decrees relating to the right of neutrals would instantly restore the commerce between the United States and France. The United States,” he continued, “did not in fact require a repeal of these decrees, having the greatest deference for the dignity of the chief of a great empire; and declared they would be satisfied if an interpretation were given to them which would thenceforward free American vessels from harassments and capture; finally, entering into the views which the Emperor had so often manifested”—that is to say, a league to humble the power and destroy the commercial navy of Great Britain. Indeed General Armstrong declared “that he was authorized, in case France should give the required explanation, and England should refuse a sufficient explanation, to state that the President of the United States would recommend an instant declaration of war against the latter Power.” These insidious propositions were not accepted by France. The Emperor persisted in requiring a repeal of the orders of the British Council before he would revoke the imperial decree, and left it with the United States to obtain such repeal by their own efforts. This attempt at reconciliation with France was then abandoned by the Americans, and the Non-intercourse Act remained in full vigour.

But while the feelings of the people of the United States were becoming daily more hostile to Great Britain, the American government, under some strange delusion, insisted upon the sincerity of France in the early repeal of her decrees. Quiescent under the outrages committed by the French upon their merchantmen, they were furious against the English. Every little incident was seized upon to inflame the public mind against Great Britain. Indeed the President sent a message to Congress stating “that the continued evidence afforded of the hostile policy of the British government against our national rights strengthens the considerations recommending and urging the preparation of adequate means for maintaining them.” The resolutions for this object were carried by such large majorities in the House of Representatives, that war became unavoidable. Both parties boasted of their moderation and forbearance; both alleged the reason and justice of their cause; nevertheless both were determined by motives of state policy operating respectively upon the interests of each country. In the beginning of the year, in order to leave no pretext for England, the American minister at Paris pressed the French government to issue an official or authentic Act; and at length, on the 10th of May, 1812, he received, as we have seen, a copy of a decree dated 28th April, 1811, by which the Berlin and Milan Decrees were repealed, so that the knowledge of this decree was withheld from the United States for more than a year,[335] and was only brought to light and publicly avowed when Napoleon had so far wrought upon the Americans as to commit them to the unfortunate war with Great Britain.

Peace was happily concluded on the 24th of Dec., 1814, and in 1815 a convention was signed in London between the United States and Great Britain to regulate the commerce and navigation between their respective countries.[336] It was framed upon the model of the English reciprocity treaties, which were the first steps taken by her towards a future greater freedom of trade. By the terms of the 2nd article, the equalisation of the duties on tonnage and imports was extended to the vessels of both nations, as far as related to their intercourse with the British dominions in Europe and the United States. By that convention the English confirmed to the United States vessels a free direct communication with their dominions in the East Indies, with liberty during peace to trade in any articles not entirely prohibited.

Pursuant to this convention, the vessels of Great Britain, and the merchandise imported therein, when they entered the ports of the United States were exempted from the payment of extra duties of tonnage and import; provided the vessels arrived from, and the merchandise consisted of the growth, produce, and manufacture of, the British dominions in Europe. The same reciprocity was conferred upon American vessels proceeding to Great Britain laden with merchandise of similar character. But at the end of Article 2 there was a special proviso, that “the intercourse between the United States and his Britannic Majesty’s possessions in the West Indies, and on the continent of North America, shall not be affected by any of the provisions of this Article, but each party shall remain in the complete possession of its rights, with respect to such an intercourse.”[337]

In retaliation, Congress on the 1st of March, 1817, passed an Act providing that “on and after the 30th of June of that year a duty of two dollars per ton” should be paid “on all foreign vessels which should enter in the United States, from any foreign place to and with which the vessels of the United States are not ordinarily permitted to enter and trade.” And it was further enacted, in almost the exact words of the English Navigation Laws, that after the 30th of September, 1817, no merchandise should be imported into the United States from any foreign place except in vessels of the United States, or in “such foreign vessels as wholly belong to the citizens or subjects of that country of which the merchandise is the growth, production, or manufacture, or from which it can only be, or most usually is, first shipped for transportation.” Adding that, “the regulations aforesaid are only applicable to the vessels of such foreign nations as have adopted or may adopt similar provisions;” and providing that “merchandise imported into the United States contrary to the Act aforesaid,[338] and the vessel in which the same is imported, are forfeited to the United States.” It was further determined that “the coasting trade is only allowed in vessels of the United States”; and that “merchandise imported from one port into another port in the United States, in a vessel belonging wholly or in part to a subject of any foreign power, unless such merchandise shall have been imported in such vessel from a foreign port, and that the same shall not have been unladen, is forfeited to the United States.”

In 1818 Congress made their navigation laws still more stringent by enacting,[339] “That from and after the 30th of September next, the ports of the United States shall be and remain closed against every vessel owned, wholly or in part, by a subject or subjects of his Britannic Majesty, coming or arriving from any port or place in a colony or territory of his Britannic Majesty, that is or shall be, by the ordinary laws of navigation and trade, closed against vessels owned by citizens of the United States; and such vessel, that in the course of the voyage shall have touched at, or cleared out from, any port or place in a colony or territory of Great Britain, which shall or may be, by the ordinary laws of navigation and trade aforesaid, open to vessels owned by citizens of the United States, shall nevertheless be deemed to have come from the port or place in the colony or territory of Great Britain, closed as aforesaid against vessels owned by citizens of the United States, from which such vessel cleared out and sailed before touching at and clearing out from an intermediate and open port or place as aforesaid; and every such vessel, so excluded from the ports of the United States, that shall enter or attempt to enter the same in violation of this Act, shall, with her tackle, apparel, and furniture, together with the cargo on board such vessel, be forfeited to the United States.”

“After the date above mentioned, no vessel owned wholly or in part by subjects of his Britannic Majesty, though the same may have been duly entered in the United States, and the duties on goods, wares, and merchandise imported duly paid, can be cleared out laden with articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United States, before the owner or consignee shall have given bond and sureties, in double the value of the articles aforesaid, that they shall not be landed in any port or place in a colony or territory of his Britannic Majesty, which by the ordinary laws of navigation and trade is closed against vessels owned by citizens of the United States.”

Such was the mode adopted by the Americans to coerce Great Britain into the relinquishment of her exclusive colonial trade. But at the very same time a negotiation was opened in London to carry out the views of the government of the United States, to settle all the differences relating to impressments, the fisheries and boundaries, and to secure a fresh treaty and convention on terms of reciprocity. Prior to entering upon the negotiations, it was agreed that the subsisting convention should be continued for a term of not less than eight years.

In 1818 a reciprocity treaty was concluded between the United States and the King of the Netherlands on the same basis as the convention subsisting with Great Britain. The Dutch colonial trade was not, however, included within the conditions of the treaty.

The President of the United States, in his proclamation dated the 24th of July, 1818, announced that he had received satisfactory proof that the burgomasters and senators of the free Hanseatic city of Bremen had abolished, after the 12th of May, 1815, all discriminating and countervailing duties, so far as they operated to the disadvantage of the United States; and accordingly he declared that the American Tonnage Duties Acts were repealed in so far as they affected Bremen. A very considerable trade in tobacco and other American productions resulted from this first step towards freedom of trade with Germany. Though England for a time rejected the principles of reciprocity in the form offered by the government of the United States to the nations of Europe and accepted by the Netherlands, it was found impossible to conduct to advantage the rapidly increasing commerce of the world in the face of these constantly recurring retaliatory measures. Consequently in 1820 she found it not merely necessary, but to her interest, to adopt a more liberal maritime policy, and to relax in some measure her stringent navigation laws.