1. “Science of Language,” first series, p. 25.

2. “Creative Evolution.”

3. For a more complete presentation of Jung’s views consult his “Theory of Psychoanalysis” in the Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series, No. 19.

4. He is said to have killed himself when he heard that she whom he so passionately adored was his mother.

5. “Wish Fulfilment and Symbolism in Fairy Tales.” Tr. by W. A. White, M.D.

6. “Dream and Myth.” Deuticke, Wien 1909.

7. “The Myth of the Birth of the Hero.”

8. “Die Symbolik in den Legenden, Märchen, Gebräuchen und Träumen.” Psychiatrisch.-Neurologische Wochenschrift, X. Jahrgang.

9. “On the Nightmare.” Amer. Journ. of Insanity, 1910.

10. Jahrbuch, 1910, Pt. II.

11. “Die Frömmigkeit des Grafen Ludwig von Zinzendorf. Ein psychoanalytischer Beitrag zur Kenntnis der religiösen Sublimationprozesse und zur Erklärung des Pietismus.” Deuticke, Wien 1910. We have a suggestive hint in Freud’s work, “Eine Kindheitserinnerung des Leonardo da Vinci.” Deuticke, Wien 1910.

12. Compare Rank in Jahrbuch, Pt. II, p. 465.

13. Compare Liepmann, “Über Ideenflucht,” Halle 1904; also Jung, “Diagnost. Assoc. Stud.,” p. 103: “Denken als Unterordnung unter eine herrschende Vorstellung”; compare Ebbinghaus, “Kultur der Gegenwart,” p. 221. Külpe (“Gr. d. Psychologie,” p. 464) expresses himself in a similar manner: “In thinking it is a question of an anticipatory apperception which sometimes governs a greater, sometimes a smaller circle of individual reproductions, and is differentiated from accidental motives of reproduction only by the consequence with which all things outside this circle are held back or repressed.”

14. In his “Psychologia empirica meth. scientif. pertract.,” etc., 1732, p. 23, Christian Wolff says simply and precisely: “Cogitatio est actus animae quo sibi rerumque aliarum extra se conscia est.”

15. The moment of adaptation is emphasized especially by William James in his definition of reasoning: “Let us make this ability to deal with novel data the technical differentia of reasoning. This will sufficiently mark it out from common associative thinking, and will immediately enable us to say just what peculiarity it contains.”

16. “Thoughts are shadows of our experiences, always darker, emptier, simpler than these,” says Nietzsche. Lotze (“Logik,” p. 552) expresses himself in regard to this as follows: “Thought, left to the logical laws of its movement, encounters once more at the end of its regularly traversed course the things suppressed or hidden.”

17. Compare the remarks of Baldwin following in text. The eccentric philosopher Johann Georg Hamann (1730–88) even places intelligence and speech as identical (see Hamann’s writings, pub. by Roth, Berlin 1821). With Nietzsche intelligence fares even worse as “speech metaphysics” (Sprachmetaphysik). Friedrich Mauthner goes the furthest in this conception (“Sprache und Psychologie,” 1901). For him there exists absolutely no thought without speech, and speaking is thinking. His idea of the “fetish of the word” governing in science is worthy of notice.

18. Compare Kleinpaul: “Das Leben der Sprache,” 3 Bände. Leipzig 1893.

19. “Jardin d’Épicure,” p. 80.

20. Speech is generated by the intellect and in turn generates intellect.

21. It is difficult to calculate how great is the seductive influence of the primitive word-meaning upon a thought. “Anything which has even been in consciousness remains as an affective moment in the unconscious,” says Hermann Paul (“Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte,” 4th ed., 1909, p. 25). The old word-meanings have an after-effect, chiefly imperceptible, “within the dark chamber of the unconscious in the Soul” (Paul). J. G. Hamann, mentioned above, expresses himself unequivocably: “Metaphysics reduces all catchwords and all figures of speech of our empirical knowledge to empty hieroglyphics and types of ideal relations.” It is said that Kant learned some things from Hamann.

22. “Grundriss der Psychologie,” p. 365.

23. “Lehrbuch der Psychologie,” X, 26.

24. James Mark Baldwin: “Thought and Things, or Genetic Logic.”

25. In this connection I must refer to an experiment which Eberschweiler (Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Psychiatrie, 1908) has made at my request, which discloses the remarkable fact that in an association experiment the intra-psychic association is influenced by phonetic considerations (“Untersuchungen über den Einfluss der sprachlichen Komponente auf die Assoziation,” Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Psychiatrie, 1908).

26. So at least this form of thought appears to Consciousness. Freud says in this connection (“The Interpretation of Dreams,” tr. by Brill, p. 418): “It is demonstrably incorrect to state that we abandon ourselves to an aimless course of ideas when we relinquish our reflections, and allow the unwilled ideas to emerge. It can be shown that we are able to reject only those end-presentations known to us, and that immediately upon the cessation of these unknown or, as we inaccurately say, unconscious end-presentations come into play which now determine the course of the unwilled ideas—a thought without end-presentation cannot be produced through any influence we can exert on our own psychic life.”

27. “Grundriss der Psychologie,” p. 464.

28. Behind this assertion stand, first of all, experiences taken from the field of the normal. The undirected thinking is very far removed from “meditation,” and especially so as far as readiness of speech is concerned. In psychological experiments I have frequently found that the subjects of the investigation—I speak only of cultivated and intelligent people, whom I have allowed to indulge in reveries, apparently unintentionally and without previous instruction—have exhibited affect-expressions which can be registered experimentally. But the basic thought of these, even with the best of intentions, they could express only incompletely or even not at all. One meets with an abundance of similar experiences in association experiments and psychoanalysis—indeed, there is hardly an unconscious complex which has not at some time existed as a phantasy in consciousness.

However, more instructive are the experiences from the domain of psychopathology. But those arising in the field of the hysterias and neuroses, which are characterized by an overwhelming transference tendency, are rarer than the experiences in the territory of the introversion type of neuroses and psychoses, which constitute by far the greater number of the mental derangements, at least the collected Schizophrenic group of Bleuler. As has already been indicated by the term “introversion,” which I briefly introduced in my study, “Konflikte der kindlichen Seele,” pp. 6 and 10, these neuroses lead to an overpowering autoerotism (Freud). And here we meet with this unutterable purely phantastic thinking, which moves in inexpressible symbols and feelings. One gets a slight impression of this when one seeks to examine the paltry and confused expressions of these people. As I have frequently observed, it costs these patients endless trouble and effort to put their phantasies into common human speech. A highly intelligent patient, who interpreted such a phantasy piece by piece, often said to me, “I know absolutely with what it is concerned, I see and feel everything, but it is quite impossible for me to find the words to express it.” The poetic and religious introversion gives rise to similar experiences; for example, Paul, in the Epistle to the Romans viii:26—“For we know not what we should pray for as we ought: but the Spirit itself maketh intercession with groanings which cannot be uttered.”

29. Similarly, James remarks, “The great difference, in fact, between that simple kind of rational thinking which consists in the concrete objects of past experience merely suggesting each other, and reason distinctively so called, is this, that whilst the empirical thinking is only reproductive, reasoning is productive.”

30. Compare the impressive description of Petrarch’s ascent of Mt. Ventoux, by Jacob Burckhardt (“Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien,” 1869, p. 235):

“One now awaits a description of the view, but in vain, not because the poet is indifferent to it, but, on the contrary, because the impression affects him all too strongly. His entire past life, with all its follies, passes before him; he recalls that it is ten years ago to-day that he, as a young man, left Bologna, and he turns a yearning glance toward Italy. He opens a book—‘Confessions of St. Augustine,’ his companion at that time—and his eye falls upon this passage in the tenth chapter: ‘and the people went there and admired the high mountains, the wide wastes of the sea and the mighty downward rushing streams, and the ocean and the courses of the stars, and forgot themselves.’ His brother, to whom he reads these words, cannot comprehend why, at this point, he closes the book and is silent.”

31. Wundt gives a striking description of the scholastic method in his “Philosophische Studien,” XIII, p. 345. The method consists “first in this, that one realizes the chief aim of scientific investigation is the discovery of a comprehensive scheme, firmly established, and capable of being applied in a uniform manner to the most varied problems; secondly, in that one lays an excessive value upon certain general ideas, and, consequently, upon the word-symbols designating these ideas, wherefore an analysis of word-meanings comes, in extreme cases, to be an empty subtlety and splitting of hairs, instead of an investigation of the real facts from which the ideas are abstracted.”

32. The concluding passage in “Traumdeutung” was of prophetic significance, and has been brilliantly established since then through investigations of the psychoses. “In the psychoses these modes of operation of the psychic mechanism, normally suppressed in the waking state, again become operative, and then disclose their inability to satisfy our needs in the outer world.” The importance of this position is emphasized by the views of Pierre Janet, developed independently of Freud, and which deserve to be mentioned here, because they add confirmation from an entirely different side, namely, the biological. Janet makes the distinction in this function of a firmly organized “inferior” and “superior” part, conceived of as in a state of continuous transformation.

“It is really on this superior part of the functions, on their adaptation to present circumstances, that the neuroses depend. The neuroses are the disturbances or the checks in the evolution of the functions—the illnesses depending upon the morbid functioning of the organism. These are characterized by an alteration in the superior part of the functions, in their evolution and in their adaptation to the present moment—to the present state of the exterior world and of the individual, and also by the absence or deterioration of the old parts of these same functions.

“In the place of these superior operations there are developed physical, mental, and, above all, emotional disturbances. This is only the tendency to replace the superior operations by an exaggeration of certain inferior operations, and especially by gross visceral disturbances” (“Les Névroses,” p. 383).

The old parts are, indeed, the inferior parts of the functions, and these replace, in a purposeless fashion, the abortive attempts at adaptation. Briefly speaking, the archaic replaces the recent function which has failed. Similar views concerning the nature of neurotic symptoms are expressed by Claparède as well (“Quelques mots sur la définition de l’Hystérie,” Arch. de Psychol., I, VII, p. 169).

He understands the hysterogenic mechanism as a “Tendance à la réversion”—as a sort of atavistic manner of reaction.

33. I am indebted to Dr. Abraham for the following interesting communication: “A little girl of three and a half years had been presented with a little brother, who became the object of the well-known childish jealousy. Once she said to her mother, ‘You are two mammas; you are my mamma, and your breast is little brother’s mamma.’ She had just been looking on with great interest at the process of nursing.” It is very characteristic of the archaic thinking of the child for the breast to be designated as “mamma.”

34. Compare especially Freud’s thorough investigation of the child in his “Analyse der Phobie eines fünfjährigen Knaben,” 1912 Jahrbuch, Pt. I. Also my study, “Konflikte der kindlichen Seele,” 1912 Jahrbuch, Pt. II, p. 33.

35. “Human, All Too Human,” Vol. II, p. 27 and on.

36. “Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre,” Pt. II, p. 205.

37. “Der Künstler, Ansätze zu einer Sexualpsychologie,” 1907, p. 36.

38. Compare also Rank’s later book, “The Myth of the Birth of the Hero.”

39. “Wish Fulfilment and Symbolism in Fairy Tales,” 1908.

40. “Dreams and Myths.”

41. Compare with this “Konflikte der kindlichen Seele,” p. 6, foot.

42. Compare Abraham, “Dreams and Myths.” New York 1913. The wish for the future is represented as already fulfilled in the past. Later, the childish phantasy is again taken up regressively in order to compensate for the disillusionment of actual life.

43. Rank: “The Myth of the Birth of the Hero.”

44. Naturally, it could not be said that because this was an institution in antiquity, the same would recur in our phantasy, but rather that in antiquity it was possible for the phantasy so generally present to become an institution. This may be concluded from the peculiar activity of the mind of antiquity.

45. The Dioscuri married the Leucippides by theft, an act which, according to the ideas of higher antiquity, belonged to the necessary customs of marriage (Preller: “Griechische Mythologie,” 1854, Pt. II, p. 68).

46. See S. Creuzer: “Symbolik und Mythologie,” 1811, Pt. III, p. 245.

47. Compare also the sodomitic phantasies in the “Metamorphoses” of Apuleius. In Herculaneum, for example, corresponding sculptures have been found.

48. Ferrero: “Les lois psychologiques du symbolisme.”

49. With the exception of the fact that the thoughts enter consciousness already in a high state of complexity, as Wundt says.

50. Schelling: “Philosophie der Mythologie,” Werke, Pt. II, considers the “preconscious” as the creative source, also H. Fichte (“Psychologie,” I, p. 508) considers the preconscious region as the place of origin of the real content of dreams.

51. Compare, in this connection, Flournoy: “Des Indes à la planète Mars.” Also Jung: “Zur Psychologie und Pathologie sogenannter okkulter Phänomene,” and “Über die Psychologie der Dementia praecox.” Excellent examples are to be found in Schreber: “Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken.” Mutze, Leipzig.

52. “Jardin d’Épicure.”

53. The figure of Judas acquires a great psychological significance as the priestly sacrificer of the Lamb of God, who, by this act, sacrifices himself at the same time. (Self-destruction.) Compare Pt. II of this work.

54. Compare with this the statements of Drews (“The Christ Myth”), which are so violently combated by the blindness of our time. Clear-sighted theologians, like Kalthoff (“Entstehung des Christentums,” 1904), present as impersonal a judgment as Drews. Kalthoff says, “The sources from which we derive our information concerning the origin of Christianity are such that in the present state of historical research no historian would undertake the task of writing the biography of an historical Jesus.” Ibid., p. 10: “To see behind these stories the life of a real historical personage, would not occur to any man, if it were not for the influence of rationalistic theology.” Ibid., p. 9: “The divine in Christ, always considered an inner attribute and one with the human, leads in a straight line backward from the scholarly man of God, through the Epistles and Gospels of the New Testament, to the Apocalypse of Daniel, in which the theological imprint of the figure of Christ has arisen. At every single point of this line Christ shows superhuman traits; nowhere is He that which critical theology wished to make Him, simply a natural man, an historic individual.”

55. Compare J. Burckhardt’s letter to Albert Brenner (pub. by Hans Brenner in the Basle Jahrbuch, 1901): “I have absolutely nothing stored away for the special interpretation of Faust. You are well provided with commentaries of all sorts. Hark! let us at once take the whole foolish pack back to the reading-room from whence they have come. What you are destined to find in Faust, that you will find by intuition. Faust is nothing else than pure and legitimate myth, a great primitive conception, so to speak, in which everyone can divine in his own way his own nature and destiny. Allow me to make a comparison: What would the ancient Greeks have said had a commentator interposed himself between them and the Oedipus legend? There was a chord of the Oedipus legend in every Greek which longed to be touched directly and respond in its own way. And thus it is with the German nation and Faust.”

56. I will not conceal the fact that for a time I was in doubt whether I dare venture to reveal through analysis the intimate personality which the author, with a certain unselfish scientific interest, has exposed to public view. Yet it seemed to me that the writer would possess an understanding deeper than any objections of my critics. There is always some risk when one exposes one’s self to the world. The absence of any personal relation with Miss Miller permits me free speech, and also exempts me from those considerations due woman which are prejudicial to conclusions. The person of the author is on that account just as shadowy to me as are her phantasies; and, like Odysseus, I have tried to let this phantom drink only enough blood to enable it to speak, and in so doing betray some of the secrets of the inner life.

I have not undertaken this analysis, for which the author owes me but little thanks, for the pleasure of revealing private and intimate matters, with the accompanying embarrassment of publicity, but because I wished to show the secret of the individual as one common to all.

57. A very beautiful example of this is found in C. A. Bernoulli: “Franz Overbeck und Friedrich Nietzsche. Eine Freundschaft,” 1908 (Pt. I, p. 72). This author depicts Nietzsche’s behavior in Basle society: “Once at a dinner he said to the young lady at his side, ‘I dreamed a short time ago that the skin of my hand, which lay before me on the table, suddenly became like glass, shiny and transparent, through which I saw distinctly the bones and the tissues and the play of the muscles. All at once I saw a toad sitting on my hand and at the same time I felt an irresistible compulsion to swallow the beast. I overcame my terrible aversion and gulped it down.’ The young lady laughed. ‘And do you laugh at that?’ Nietzsche asked, his deep eyes fixed on his companion, half questioning, half sorrowful. The young lady knew intuitively that she did not wholly understand that an oracle had spoken to her in the form of an allegory and that Nietzsche had revealed to her a glimpse into the dark abyss of his inner self.” On page 166 Bernoulli continues as follows: “One can perhaps see, behind that harmless pleasure of faultless exactness in dress, a dread of contamination arising from some mysterious and tormenting disgust.”

Nietzsche went to Basle when he was very young; he was then just at the age when other young people are contemplating marriage. Seated next to a young woman, he tells her that something terrible and disgusting is taking place in his transparent hand, something which he must take completely into his body. We know what illness caused the premature ending of Nietzsche’s life. It was precisely this which he would tell the young lady, and her laughter was indeed discordant.

58. A whole series of psychoanalytic experiences could easily be produced here to illustrate this statement.

59. Ferenczi: “Introjektion und Übertragung,” Jahrbuch, Pt. I (1912).

60. The choice of words and comparisons is always significant. A psychology of travels and the unconscious forces co-operating with them is yet to be written.

61. This mental disturbance had until recently the very unfortunate designation, Dementia Praecox, given by Kraepelin. It is extremely unfortunate that this malady should have been discovered by the psychiatrists, for its apparently bad prognosis is due to this circumstance. Dementia praecox is synonymous with therapeutic hopelessness. How would hysteria appear if judged from the standpoint of psychiatry! The psychiatrist naturally sees in the institutions only the worst cases of dementia praecox, and as a consequence of his therapeutic helplessness he must be a pessimist. How deplorable would tuberculosis appear if the physician of an asylum for the incurable described the nosology of this disease! Just as little as the chronic cases of hysteria, which gradually degenerate in insane asylums, are characteristic of real hysteria, just so little are the cases of dementia praecox in asylums characteristic of those early forms so frequent in general practice, and which Janet has described under the name of Psychasthenia. These cases fall under Bleuler’s description of Schizophrenia, a name which connotes a psychological fact, and might easily be compared with similar facts in hysteria. The term which I use in my private work for these conditions is Introversion Neurosis, by which, in my opinion, the most important characteristic of the condition is given, namely, the predominance of introversion over transference, which latter is the characteristic feature of hysteria.

In my “Psychology of Dementia Praecox” I have not made any study of the relationship of the Psychasthenia of Janet. Subsequent experience with Dementia Praecox, and particularly the study of Psychasthenia in Paris, have demonstrated to me the essential relationship of Janet’s group with the Introversion Neuroses (the Schizophrenia of Bleuler).

62. Compare the similar views in my article, “Über die Psychologie der Dementia praecox,” Halle 1907; and “Inhalt der Psychose,” Deuticke, Wien 1908. Also Abraham: “Die psychosexuellen Differenzen der Hysterie und der Dementia praecox,” Zentralblatt für Nervenheilkunde und Psychiatrie, 1908. This author, in support of Freud, defines the chief characteristic of dementia praecox as Autoerotism, which as I have asserted is only one of the results of Introversion.

63. Freud, to whom I am indebted for an essential part of this view, also speaks of “Heilungsversuch,” the attempt toward cure, the search for health.

64. Miss Miller’s publication gives no hint of any knowledge of psychoanalysis.

65. Here I purposely give preference to the term “Imago” rather than to the expression “Complex,” in order, by the choice of terminology, to invest this psychological condition, which I include under “Imago,” with living independence in the psychical hierarchy, that is to say, with that autonomy which, from a large experience, I have claimed as the essential peculiarity of the emotional complex. (Compare “The Psychology of Dementia Praecox.”) My critics, Isserlin especially, have seen in this view a return to medieval psychology, and they have, therefore, rejected it utterly. This “return” took place on my part consciously and intentionally because the phantastic, projected psychology of ancient and modern superstition, especially demonology, furnishes exhaustive evidence for this point of view. Particularly interesting insight and confirmation is given us by the insane Schreber in an autobiography (“Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken,” Mutze, Leipzig), where he has given complete expression to the doctrine of autonomy.

“Imago” has a significance similar on the one hand to the psychologically conceived creation in Spitteler’s novel “Imago,” and upon the other hand to the ancient religious conception of “imagines et lares.”

66. Compare my article, “Die Bedeutung des Vaters für das Schicksal des Einzelnen.”

67. As is well known, Anaxagoras developed the conception that the living primal power (Urpotenz) of νοῦς (mind) imparts movement, as if by a blast of wind, to the dead primal power (Urpotenz) of matter. There is naturally no mention of sound. This νοῦς, which is very similar to the later conception of Philo, the λόγος σπερματικός of the Gnostics and the Pauline πνεῦμα (spirit) as well as to the πνεῦμα of the contemporary Christian theologians, has rather the old mythological significance of the fructifying breath of the winds, which impregnated the mares of Lusitania, and the Egyptian vultures. The animation of Adam and the impregnation of the Mother of God by the πνεῦμα are produced in a similar manner. The infantile incest phantasy of one of my patients reads: “the father covered her face with his hands and blew into her open mouth.”

68. Haydn’s “Creation” might be meant.

69. See Job xvi: 1–11.

70. I recall the case of a young insane girl who continually imagined that her innocence was suspected, from which thought she would not allow herself to be dissuaded. Gradually there developed out of her defensive attitude a correspondingly energetic positive erotomania.

71. Compare the preceding footnote with the text of Miss Miller’s.

72. The case is published in “Zur Psychologie und Pathologie sogenannter okkulter Phänomene.” Mutze, Leipzig 1902.

73. Compare Freud’s “Analyse der Phobie eines fünfjährigen Knaben,” Jahrbuch, Vol. I, 1st half; also Jung: “Konflikte der kindlichen Seele,” Jahrbuch, II, Vol. I.

74. Others do not make use of this step, but are directly carried away by Eros.

75. The heaven above, the heaven below, the sky above, the sky below, all things above, all things below, decline and rise.

76. “La sagesse et la destinée.”

77. This time I shall hardly be spared the reproach of mysticism. But perhaps the facts should be further considered; doubtless the unconscious contains material which does not rise to the threshold of consciousness. The analysis dissolves these combinations into their historical determinants, for it is one of the essential tasks of analysis to render impotent by dissolution the content of the complexes competing with the proper conduct of life. Psychoanalysis works backwards like the science of history. Just as the largest part of the past is so far removed that it is not reached by history, so too the greater part of the unconscious determinants is unreachable. History, however, knows nothing of two kinds of things, that which is hidden in the past and that which is hidden in the future. Both perhaps might be attained with a certain probability; the first as a postulate, the second as an historical prognosis. In so far as to-morrow is already contained in to-day, and all the threads of the future are in place, so a more profound knowledge of the past might render possible a more or less far-reaching and certain knowledge of the future. Let us transfer this reasoning, as Kant has already done, to psychology. Then necessarily we must come to the same result. Just as traces of memory long since fallen below the threshold of consciousness are accessible in the unconscious, so too there are certain very fine subliminal combinations of the future, which are of the greatest significance for future happenings in so far as the future is conditioned by our own psychology. But just so little as the science of history concerns itself with the combinations for the future, which is the function of politics, so little, also, are the psychological combinations for the future the object of analysis; they would be much more the object of an infinitely refined psychological synthesis, which attempts to follow the natural current of the libido. This we cannot do, but possibly this might happen in the unconscious, and it appears as if from time to time, in certain cases, significant fragments of this process come to light, at least in dreams. From this comes the prophetic significance of the dream long claimed by superstition.

The aversion of the scientific man of to-day to this type of thinking, hardly to be called phantastic, is merely an overcompensation to the very ancient and all too great inclination of mankind to believe in prophesies and superstitions.

78. Dreams seem to remain spontaneously in the memory just so long as they give a correct résumé of the psychologic situation of the individual.

79. How paltry are the intrinsic ensemble and the detail of the erotic experience, is shown by this frequently varied love song which I quote in its epirotic form:

80. Job xli: 13 (Leviathan).

“21. His breath kindleth coals, and a flame goeth out of his mouth.

“22. In his neck remaineth strength, and sorrow is turned into joy before him.

“24. His heart is as firm as a stone; yea, as hard as a piece of the nether millstone.

“25. When he raiseth up himself, the mighty are afraid: by reason of breakings they purify themselves.

“33. Upon earth there is not his like who is made without fear.

“34. He beholdeth all high things: he is a king over all the children of pride.”

Chapter xlii.

“1. Then Job answered the Lord, and said,

“2. I know that thou canst do everything, and that no thought can be withholden from thee.”

81. The theriomorphic attributes are lacking in the Christian religion except as remnants, such as the Dove, the Fish and the Lamb. The latter is also represented as a Ram in the drawings in the Catacombs. Here belong the animals associated with the Evangelists which particularly need historical explanation. The Eagle and the Lion were definite degrees of initiation in the Mithraic mysteries. The worshippers of Dionysus called themselves βόες because the god was represented as a bull; likewise the ἄρκτοι of Artemis, conceived of as a she-bear. The Angel might correspond to the ἡλιόδρομοι of the Mithras mysteries. It is indeed an exquisite invention of the Christian phantasy that the animal coupled with St. Anthony is the pig, for the good saint was one of those who were subjected to the devil’s most evil temptations.