Not continual,
		as Number.				Line.
Quantity.				Of itself, as		Superficies.
						Solid.
		Continual
						Time, by Line.
						Motion, by Line and
				By accident, as		Time.
						Force, by Motion and
						Solid.

Where, it is to be noted, that line, superficies, and solid, may be said to be of such and such quantity, that is, to be originally and of their own nature capable of equality and inequality; but we cannot say there is either majority or minority, or equality, or indeed any quantity at all, in time, without the help of line and motion; nor in motion, without line and time; nor in force, otherwise than by motion and solid.

The Form of the Predicament of Quality.

						Seeing.
						Hearing.
				Primary		Smelling.
						Tasting.
		Perception				Touching.
		by Sense
						Imagination.
				Secondary		Affection		pleasant.
Quality								unpleasant.
				By Seeing, as Light and Colour.
				By Hearing, as Sound.
		Sensible		By Smelling, as Odours.
		Quality		By Tasting, as Savours.
				By Touching, as Hardness, Heat,
				Cold, &c.

The Form of the Predicament of Relation.

		Magnitudes, as Equality and Inequality.
		Qualities, as Likeness and Unlikeness.
Relation of				Together		In Place.
						In Time.
		Order
						In Place		Former.
				Not together				Later
						In Time		Former.
								Later

16. Concerning which predicaments it is to be noted, in the first place, that as the division is made in the first predicament into contradictory names, so it might have been done in the rest. For, as there, body is divided into animated and not-animated, so, in the second predicament, continual quantity may be divided into line and not-line, and again, not-line into superficies and not-superficies, and so in the rest; but it was not necessary.

Secondly, it is to be observed, that of positive names the former comprehends the latter; but of negatives the former is comprehended by the latter. For example, living-creature is the name of every man, and therefore it comprehends the name man; but, on the contrary, not-man is the name of everything which is not-living-creature, and therefore the name not-living-creature, which is put first, is comprehended by the latter name, not-man.

Thirdly, we must take heed that we do not think, that as names, so the diversities of things themselves may be searched out and determined by such distinctions as these; or that arguments may be taken from hence (as some have done ridiculously) to prove that the kinds of things are not infinite.

Fourthly, I would not have any man think I deliver the forms above for a true and exact ordination of names; for this cannot be performed as long as philosophy remains imperfect; nor that by placing (for example) light in the predicament of qualities, while another places the same in the predicament of bodies, I pretend that either of us ought for this to be drawn from his opinion; for this is to be done only by arguments and ratiocination, and not by disposing of words into classes.

Lastly, I confess I have not yet seen any great use of the predicaments in philosophy. I believe Aristotle when he saw he could not digest the things themselves into such orders, might nevertheless desire out of his own authority to reduce words to such forms, as I have done; but I do it only for this end, that it may be understood what this ordination of words is, and not to have it received for true, till it be demonstrated by good reason to be so.

CHAPTER III.

OF PROPOSITION.

1. Divers kinds of speech.—2. Proposition defined.—3. Subject, predicate, and copula, what they are; and abstract and concrete what. 4. The use and abuse of names abstract.—5. Proposition, universal and particular.—6. Affirmative and negative.—7. True and false.—8. True and false belongs to speech, and not to things.—9. Proposition, primary, not primary, definition, axiom, petition.—10. Proposition, necessary and contingent.—11. Categorical and hypothetical.—12. The same proposition diversely pronounced.—13. Propositions that may be reduced to the same categorical proposition, are equipollent.—14. Universal propositions converted by contradictory names, are equipollent.—15. Negative propositions are the same, whether negation be before or after the copula.—16. Particular propositions simply converted, are equipollent.—17. What are subaltern, contrary, subcontrary, and contradictory propositions.—18. Consequence, what it is.—19. Falsity cannot follow from truth.—20. How one proposition is the cause of another.

1. From the connexion or contexture of names arise divers kinds of speech, whereof some signify the desires and affections of men; such are, first, interrogations, which denote the desire of knowing: as, Who is a good man? In which speech there is one name expressed, and another desired and expected from him of whom we ask the same. Then prayers, which signify the desire of having something; promises, threats, wishes, commands, complaints, and other significations of other affections. Speech may also be absurd and insignificant; as when there is a succession of words, to which there can be no succession of thoughts in mind to answer them; and this happens often to such, as, understanding nothing in some subtle matter, do, nevertheless, to make others believe they understand, speak of the same incoherently; for the connection of incoherent words, though it want the end of speech (which is signification) yet it is speech; and is used by writers of metaphysics almost as frequently as speech significative. In philosophy, there is but one kind of speech useful, which some call in Latin dictum, others enuntiatum et pronunciatum; but most men call it proposition, and is the speech of those that affirm or deny, and expresseth truth or falsity.

2. A PROPOSITION is a speech consisting of two names copulated, by which he that speaketh signifies he conceives the latter name to be the name of the same thing whereof the former is the name; or (which is all one) that the former name is comprehended by the latter. For example, this speech, man is a living creature, in which two names are copulated by the verb is, is a proposition, for this reason, that he that speaks it conceives both living creature and man to be names of the same thing, or that the former name, man, is comprehended by the latter name, living creature. Now the former name is commonly called the subject, or antecedent, or the contained name, and the latter predicate, consequent, or containing name. The sign of connection amongst most nations is either some word, as the word is in the proposition man is a living creature, or some case or termination of a word, as in this proposition, man walketh (which is equivalent to this, man is walking); the termination by which it is said he walketh, rather than he is walking, signifieth that those two are understood to be copulated, or to be names of the same thing.

But there are, or certainly may be, some nations that have no word which answers to our verb is, who nevertheless form propositions by the position only of one name after another, as if instead of man is a living creature, it should be said man a living creature; for the very order of the names may sufficiently show their connection; and they are as apt and useful in philosophy, as if they were copulated by the verb is.

3. Wherefore, in every proposition three things are to be considered, viz. the two names, which are the subject, and the predicate, and their copulation; both which names raise in our mind the thought of one and the same thing; but the copulation makes us think of the cause for which those names were imposed on that thing. As, for example, when we say a body is moveable, though we conceive the same thing to be designed by both those names, yet our mind rests not there, but searches farther what it is to be a body, or to be moveable, that is, wherein consists the difference betwixt these and other things, for which these are so called, others are not so called. They, therefore, that seek what it is to be any thing, as to be moveable, to be hot, &c. seek in things the causes of their names.

And from hence arises that distinction of names (touched in the last chapter) into concrete and abstract. For concrete is the name of any thing which we suppose to have a being, and is therefore called the subject, in Latin suppositum, and in Greek ὑποκέιμενον; as body, moveable, moved, figurate, a cubit high, hot, cold, like, equal, Appius, Lentulus, and the like; and, abstract is that which in any subject denotes the cause of the concrete name, as to be a body, to be moveable, to be moved, to be figurate, to be of such quantity, to be hot, to be cold, to be like, to be equal, to be Appius, to be Lentulus, &c. Or names equivalent to these, which are most commonly called abstract names, as corporiety, mobility, motion, figure, quantity, heat, cold, likeness, equality, and (as Cicero has it) Appiety and Lentulity. Of the same kind also are infinitives; for to live and to move are the same with life and motion, or to be living and to be moved. But abstract names denote only the causes of concrete names, and not the things themselves. For example, when we see any thing, or conceive in our mind any visible thing, that thing appears to us, or is conceived by us, not in one point, but as having parts distant from one another, that is, as being extended and filling some space. Seeing therefore we call the thing so conceived body, the cause of that name is, that that thing is extended, or the extension or corporiety of it. So when we see a thing appear sometimes here, sometimes there, and call it moved or removed, the cause of that name is that it is moved or the motion of the same.

And these causes of names are the same with the causes of our conceptions, namely, some power of action, or affection of the thing conceived, which some call the manner by which any thing works upon our senses, but by most men they are called accidents; I say accidents, not in that sense in which accident is opposed to necessary; but so, as being neither the things themselves, nor parts thereof, do nevertheless accompany the things in such manner, that (saving extension) they may all perish, and be destroyed, but can never be abstracted.

4. There is also this difference betwixt concrete and abstract names, that those were invented before propositions, but these after; for these could have no being till there were propositions, from whose copula they proceed. Now in all matters that concern this life, but chiefly in philosophy, there is both great use and great abuse of abstract names; and the use consists in this, that without them we cannot, for the most part, either reason, or compute the properties of bodies; for when we would multiply, divide, add, or substract heat, light, or motion, if we should double or add them together by concrete names, saying (for example) hot is double to hot, light double to light, or moved double to moved, we should not double the properties, but the bodies themselves that are hot, light, moved, &c. which we would not do. But the abuse proceeds from this, that some men seeing they can consider, that is (as I said before) bring into account the increasings and decreasings of quantity, heat and other accidents, without considering their bodies or subjects (which they call abstracting, or making to exist apart by themselves) they speak of accidents, as if they might be separated from all bodies. And from hence proceed the gross errors of writers of metaphysics; for, because they can consider thought without the consideration of body, they infer there is no need of a thinking-body; and because quantity may be considered without considering body, they think also that quantity may be without body, and body without quantity; and that a body has quantity by the addition of quantity to it. From the same fountain spring those insignificant words, abstract substance, separated essence, and the like; as also that confusion of words derived from the Latin verb est, as essence, essentiality, entity, entitative; besides reality, aliquiddity, quiddity, &c. which could never have been heard of among such nations as do not copulate their names by the verb is, but by adjective verbs, as runneth, readeth, &c. or by the mere placing of one name after another; and yet seeing such nations compute and reason, it is evident that philosophy has no need of those words essence, entity, and other the like barbarous terms.

5. There are many distinctions of propositions, whereof the first is, that some are universal, others particular, others indefinite, and others singular; and this is commonly called the distinction of quantity. An universal proposition is that whose subject is affected with the sign of an universal name, as every man is a living creature. Particular, that whose subject is affected with the sign of a particular name, as some man is learned. An indefinite proposition has for its subject a common name, and put without any sign, as man is a living creature, man is learned. And a singular proposition is that whose subject is a singular name, as Socrates is a philosopher, this man is black.

6. The second distinction is into affirmative and negative, and is called the distinction of quality. An affirmative proposition is that whose predicate is a positive name, as man is a living creature. Negative, that whose predicate is a negative name, as man is not a stone.

7. The third distinction is, that one is true, another false. A true proposition is that, whose predicate contains, or comprehends its subject, or whose predicate is the name of every thing, of which the subject is the name; as man is a living creature is therefore a true proposition, because whatsoever is called man, the same is also called living creature; and some man is sick, is true, because sick is the name of some man. That which is not true, or that whose predicate does not contain its subject, is called a false proposition, as man is a stone.

Now these words true, truth, and true proposition, are equivalent to one another; for truth consists in speech, and not in the things spoken of; and though true be sometimes opposed to apparent or feigned, yet it is always to be referred to the truth of proposition; for the image of a man in a glass, or a ghost, is therefore denied to be a very man, because this proposition, a ghost is a man, is not true; for it cannot be denied but that a ghost is a very ghost. And therefore truth or verity is not any affection of the thing, but of the proposition concerning it. As for that which the writers of metaphysics say, that a thing, one thing, and a very thing, are equivalent to one another, it is but trifling and childish; for who does not know, that a man, one man, and a very man, signify the same.

8. And from hence it is evident, that truth and falsity have no place but amongst such living creatures as use speech. For though some brute creatures, looking upon the image of a man in a glass, may be affected with it, as if it were the man himself, and for this reason fear it or fawn upon it in vain; yet they do not apprehend it as true or false, but only as like; and in this they are not deceived. Wherefore, as men owe all their true ratiocination to the right understanding of speech; so also they owe their errors to the misunderstanding of the same; and as all the ornaments of philosophy proceed only from man, so from man also is derived the ugly absurdity of false opinions. For speech has something in it like to a spider's web, (as it was said of old of Solon's laws) for by contexture of words tender and delicate wits are ensnared and stopped; but strong wits break easily through them.

From hence also this may be deduced, that the first truths were arbitrarily made by those that first of all imposed names upon things, or received them from the imposition of others. For it is true (for example) that man is a living creature, but it is for this reason, that it pleased men to impose both those names on the same thing.

9. Fourthly, propositions are distinguished into primary and not primary. Primary is that wherein the subject is explicated by a predicate of many names, as man is a body, animated, rational; for that which is comprehended in the name man, is more largely expressed in the names body, animated, and rational, joined together; and it is called primary, because it is first in ratiocination; for nothing can be proved, without understanding first the name of the thing in question. Now primary propositions are nothing but definitions, or parts of definitions, and these only are the principles of demonstration, being truths constituted arbitrarily by the inventors of speech, and therefore not to be demonstrated. To these propositions, some have added others, which they call primary and principles, namely, axioms, and common notions; which, (though they be so evident that they need no proof) yet, because they may be proved, are not truly principles; and the less to be received for such, in regard propositions not intelligible, and sometimes manifestly false, are thrust on us under the name of principles by the clamour of men, who obtrude for evident to others, all that they themselves think true. Also certain petitions are commonly received into the number of principles; as, for example, that a straight line may be drawn between two points, and other petitions of the writers of geometry; and these are indeed the principles of art or construction, but not of science and demonstration.

10. Fifthly, propositions are distinguished into necessary, that is, necessarily true; and true, but not necessarily, which they call contingent. A necessary proposition is when nothing can at any time be conceived or feigned, whereof the subject is the name, but the predicate also is the name of the same thing; as man is a living creature is a necessary proposition, because at what time soever we suppose the name man agrees with any thing, at that time the name living-creature also agrees with the same. But a contingent proposition is that, which at one time may be true, at another time false; as every crow is black; which may perhaps be true now, but false hereafter. Again, in every necessary proposition, the predicate is either equivalent to the subject, as in this, man is a rational living creature; or part of an equivalent name, as in this, man is a living creature, for the name rational-living-creature, or man, is compounded of these two, rational and living-creature. But in a contingent proposition this cannot be; for though this were true, every man is a liar, yet because the word liar is no part of a compounded name equivalent to the name man, that proposition is not to be called necessary, but contingent, though it should happen to be true always. And therefore those propositions only are necessary, which are of sempiternal truth, that is, true at all times. From hence also it is manifest, that truth adheres not to things, but to speech only, for some truths are eternal; for it will be eternally true, if man, then living-creature; but that any man, or living-creature, should exist eternally, is not necessary.

11. A sixth distinction of propositions is into categorical and hypothetical. A categorical proposition is that which is simply or absolutely pronounced, as every man is a living-creature, no man is a tree; and hypothetical is that which is pronounced conditionally, as, if any thing be a man, the same is also a living-creature, if anything be a man, the same is also not-a-stone.

A categorical proposition, and an hypothetical answering it, do both signify the same, if the propositions be necessary; but not if they be contingent. For example, if this, every man is a living-creature, be true, this also will be true, if any thing be a man, the same is also a living-creature; but in contingent propositions, though this be true, every crow is black, yet this, if any thing be a crow, the same is black, is false. But an hypothetical proposition is then rightly said to be true, when the consequence is true, as every man is a living-creature, is rightly said to be a true proposition, because of whatsoever it is truly said that is a man, it cannot but be truly said also, the same is a living creature. And therefore whensoever an hypothetical proposition is true, the categorical answering it, is not only true, but also necessary; which I thought worth the noting, as an argument, that philosophers may in most things reason more solidly by hypothetical than categorical propositions.

12. But seeing every proposition may be, and uses to be, pronounced and written in many forms, and we are obliged to speak in the same manner as most men speak, yet they that learn philosophy from masters, had need to take heed they be not deceived by the variety of expressions. And therefore, whensoever they meet with any obscure proposition, they ought to reduce it to its most simple and categorical form; in which the copulative word is must be expressed by itself, and not mingled in any manner either with the subject or predicate, both which must be separated and clearly distinguished one from another. For example, if this proposition, man can not sin, be compared with this, man cannot sin, their difference will easily appear if they be reduced to these, man is able not to sin, and, man is not able to sin, where the predicates are manifestly different. But they ought to do this silently by themselves, or betwixt them and their masters only; for it will be thought both ridiculous and absurd, for a man to use such language publicly. Being therefore to speak of equipollent propositions, I put in the first place all those for equipollent, that may be reduced purely to one and the same categorical proposition.

13. Secondly, that which is categorical and necessary, is equipollent to its hypothetical proposition; as this categorical, a right-lined triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles, to this hypothetical, if any figure be a right-lined triangle, the three angles of it are equal to two right angles.

14. Also, any two universal propositions, of which the terms of the one (that is, the subject and predicate) are to the terms of the other, and their order inverted, as these, every man is a living creature, and every thing that is not a living-creature is not a man, are equipollent. For seeing every man is a living creature is a true proposition, the name living creature contains the name man; but they are both positive names, and therefore (by the last article of the precedent chapter) the negative name not man, contains the negative name not living-creature; wherefore every thing that is not a living-creature, is not a man, is a true proposition. Likewise these, no man is a tree, no tree is a man, are equipollent. For if it be true that tree is not the name of any man, then no one thing can be signified by the two names man and tree, wherefore no tree is a man is a true proposition. Also to this, whatsoever is not a living-creature is not a man, where both the terms are negative, this other proposition is equipollent, only a living creature is a man.

15. Fourthly, negative propositions, whether the particle of negation be set after the copula as some nations do, or before it, as it is in Latin and Greek, if the terms be the same, are equipollent: as, for example, man is not a tree, and, man is not-a-tree, are equipollent, though Aristotle deny it. Also these, every man is not a tree, and no man is a tree, are equipollent, and that so manifestly, as it needs not be demonstrated.

16. Lastly, all particular propositions that have their terms inverted, as these, some man is blind, some blind thing is a man, are equipollent; for either of the two names, is the name of some one and the same man; and therefore in which soever of the two orders they be connected, they signify the same truth.

17. Of propositions that have the same terms, and are placed in the same order, but varied either by quantity or quality, some are called subaltern, others contrary, others subcontrary, and others contradictory.

Subaltern, are universal and particular propositions of the same quality; as, every man is a living creature, some man is a living creature; or, no man is wise, some man is not wise. Of these, if the universal be true, the particular will be true also.

Contrary, are universal propositions of different quality; as, every man is happy, no man is happy. And of these, if one be true, the other is false: also, they may both be false, as in the example given.

Subcontrary, are particular propositions of different quality; as, some man is learned, some man is not learned; which cannot be both false, but they may be both true.

Contradictory are those that differ both in quantity and quality; as, every man is a living creature, some man is not a living-creature; which can neither be both true, nor both false.

18. A proposition is said to follow from two other propositions, when these being granted to be true, it cannot be denied but the other is true also. For example, let these two propositions, every man is a living creature, and, every living creature is a body, be supposed true, that is, that body is the name of every living creature, and living creature the name of every man. Seeing therefore, if these be understood to be true, it cannot be understood that body is not the name of every man, that is, that every man is a body is false, this proposition will be said to follow from those two, or to be necessarily inferred from them.

19. That a true proposition may follow from false propositions, may happen sometimes; but false from true, never. For if these, every man is a stone, and every stone is a living creature, (which are both false) be granted to be true, it is granted also that living creature is the name of every stone, and stone of every man, that is, that living creature is the name of every man; that is to say, this proposition every man is a living creature, is true, as it is indeed true. Wherefore a true proposition may sometimes follow from false. But if any two propositions be true, a false one can never follow from them. For if true follow from false, for this reason only, that the false are granted to be true, then truth from two truths granted will follow in the same manner.

20. Now, seeing none but a true proposition will follow from true, and that the understanding of two propositions to be true, is the cause of understanding that also to be true which is deduced from them; the two antecedent propositions are commonly called the causes of the inferred proposition, or conclusion. And from hence it is that logicians say, the premises are causes of the conclusion; which may pass, though it be not properly spoken; for though understanding be the cause of understanding, yet speech is not the cause of speech. But when they say, the cause of the properties of any thing, is the thing itself, they speak absurdly. For example, if a figure be propounded which is triangular; seeing every triangle has all its angles together equal to two right angles, from whence it follows that all the angles of that figure are equal to two right angles, they say, for this reason, that that figure is the cause of that equality. But seeing the figure does not itself make its angles, and therefore cannot be said to be the efficient-cause, they call it the formal-cause; whereas indeed it is no cause at all; nor does the property of any figure follow the figure, but has its being at the same time with it; only the knowledge of the figure goes before the knowledge of the properties; and one knowledge is truly the cause of another knowledge, namely the efficient cause.

And thus much concerning proposition; which in the progress of philosophy is the first step, like the moving towards of one foot. By the due addition of another step I shall proceed to syllogism, and make a complete pace. Of which in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

OF SYLLOGISM.

1. The definition of syllogism.—2. In a syllogism there are but three terms.—3. Major, minor, and middle term; also major and minor proposition, what they are.—4. The middle term in every syllogism ought to be determined in both the propositions to one and the same thing.—5. From two particular propositions nothing can be concluded.—6. A syllogism is the collection of two propositions into one sum.—7. The figure of a syllogism, what it is.—8. What is in the mind answering to a syllogism.—9. The first indirect figure, how it is made.—10. The second indirect figure, how made.—11. How the third indirect figure is made.—12. There are many moods in every figure, but most of them useless in philosophy.—13. An hypothetical syllogism when equipollent to a categorical.